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Abstract 
Now that the worst of the financial storm is over, regulators are setting new strategies to 
deal  with  the  systemic  importance  of  the  €427  trillion  ($604  trillion)  over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives market. This paper explores the three major sources of disruptive effects 
in OTC derivatives: liquidity, counterparty risk and legal uncertainty. These risks affect the 
value chain of a typical derivative transaction and weaken the economic and legal rationale 
behind their widespread use. On the policy side, commitments have been made at G-20 level 
to draft uniform rules on a global scale “to build a safer financial system”. This paper finds, 
however, that in practice, the EU and US proposals lay out divergent roads to meet common 
objectives  and  the  author  warns  that  such  divergences  may  encourage  regulatory  and 
supervisory arbitrage. Policy options currently under discussion may need further revision. 
For instance, access to network clearing infrastructures, such as CCPs, can only be made 
available  to  a  restricted  group  of  eligible  derivative  products.  Mechanisms  of  adverse 
selection and moral hazard, then, may at any time affect the efficient functioning of these 
crucial infrastructures for financial markets. 
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Shaping Reforms and Business Models 
for the OTC Derivatives Market 
Quo vadis? 
ECMI Research Report No. 5/April 2010 
Diego Valiante
* 
1.  Introduction 
Riding the wave of public sentiment and acknowledging the need to overhaul financial markets, 
regulators  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  are  drafting  new  rules  for  derivatives,  which  are 
financial  instruments  whose  value  (price  of  the  contract)  is  derived  from  the  value  of  an 
underlying asset (e.g. equity, bond or commodity) or market variable (e.g. interest rate, credit 
risk,  exchange  rate  or  stock  index).
1  They  are typically  traded over-the-counter (OTC), i.e. 
directly  between  two  parties  without  going  through  an   organised  exchange  or  other 
intermediary. To date, the market has largely been unregulated,
2 like other innovative areas of 
financial markets, although some market players have been recently affected by reg ulation and 
market initiatives through capital requirements and stronger market discipline.
3 As a result of 
increased systemic risks
4 and financial instability attributed to co unterparties‟ risks of failure 
(and so-called „cascade effects‟), however, forthcoming regulation aims to shape a new trading 
and post-trading landscape for the OTC derivatives market and related business models adopted 
by firms.  
However, despite some specific issues (e.g. uncertainty over real uncollateralised exposures to 
OTC  derivatives  after  the  collapse  of  Lehman  Brothers),  the  trading  and  post-trading 
infrastructure  of  the  OTC  derivatives  market  showed  strong  resilience  in  dealing  with  big 
counterparties‟ failures during the financial turmoil. It processed trillions of trades with minor 
repercussions for the safety of the global financial system, even though state intervention was 
needed for some pivotal financial institutions, due to their inability to face soaring counterparty 
risks as a result of the financial crisis (e.g. AIG). Current proposals at EU and US level are 
strenuously  trying  to  push  derivatives  „on-the-counter‟, questioning  the  future  prospects  for 
trade execution and clearing and settlement platforms. On the one hand, there is strong pressure 
                                                       
*  Diego  Valiante  (PhD)  is  researcher  at  the  European  Capital  Markets  Institute  and  the  Centre  for 
European Policy Studies. Comments from Cinzia Alcidi, Piero Cinquegrana, Godfried De Vidts, Toni 
Freeman,  Christian  Held,  Karel  Lannoo,  Barbara  Matthews,  Richard  Metcalfe,  Donald  Ricketts  and 
Ingrid Vogel are gratefully acknowledged. 
1  See  European  Commission ,  “Derivatives  Markets”,  FAQs  (available  at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/314&format=HTML&aged=0&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en). 
2 US Treasury Department (2009, p. 47). 
3 In particular, some players – such as banks – fall under Basel II agreements, which impose a large set of 
rules concerning capital requirements, supervision and market discipline. 
4 An activity or financial institution may involve relevant risks for its „systemic‟ size, degree of leverage 
and level of interconnection in the global financial system. In effect, failures to capture systemic risks can 
be  caused  by  methodologies  that  do  not  take  into  account  their  role  in  financial  systems,  network 
externalities and the effect of pro-cyclical behaviour fuelled by periods in which the measured risk is 
particularly low. See Goodhart et al. (2008, Foreword); FSA (2009, p. 23).  2 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
for standardisation and data reporting, and on the other, there is an underlying trade-off with 
customisation and liquidity, which can be a source of instability in the long run. 
This paper is divided into four parts. 
The first part (sections 2-4) explores three major aspects of the OTC derivatives market: 1) the 
economic reasons behind the use of derivatives, 2) the systemic importance of this market with 
a  detailed  analysis  of  the  level  of  risk  concentration  and  its  impact  and  3)  the  legal  and 
economic reasons behind the rapid and huge growth of this financial market.  
The second part (sections 5-6) deals with the micro aspects of the derivatives market: 1) the 
nature of the transactions and legal and economic risks involved, 2) the value chain with a focus 
on  the  financial  infrastructure  behind  derivative  transactions  and  3)  issues  currently  under 
debate such as standardisation, the risks and benefits of CCPs and competitive data repositories.  
In the third part (section 7), we analyse the general impact of the recent financial crisis on the 
market for OTC derivatives, highlighting the major sources of concerns.  
In the final part (sections 8-9), we describe the new legislative proposals under debate in the EU 
and the US and assess the future prospects of this market. On that basis, we then draw some 
policy conclusions.  
2.  Setting the scene 
The origins of derivative financial instruments date back to ancient times.
5 Over-the-counter 
derivatives are usually bilateral,  privately negotiated contracts  that can be settled in cash or 
physically (Culp, 2009, p. 5). Therefore, they are customised and off-exchange, in order to meet 
specific needs of the involved counterparties (ECB, 2009).  By some they might be seen as a 
„bet‟.  However,  investing  in  a  safe  German  Bund  is  also  equivalent  to  betting  on  the  low 
probability of a surge in the rate of inflation. “It is a bet on a bet”, typically used to hedge 
another position in the market. 
OTC derivatives can be classified into four categories: futures (and forwards), options, swaps 
and  exotic  instruments.
6  Transactions  are  generally  „customised‟,  i.e.  tailored  to  a  firm‟s 
idiosyncratic risks.   
A derivatives transaction may be set up for any one of four different reasons: hedging, funding, 
speculation and arbitrage. 
Firstly, firms or financial institutions seek hedged positions in case they cannot directly bear 
that risk. An example is the protection, through currency options, against currency risk of a 
relevant investment in a foreign country and currency. Hence, the protection buyer transfers the 
economic risk related to a market variable (e.g. a possible surge in the price of oil or a currency 
trend) to other firms or financial institutions willing and effectively prepared to bear the risk 
(protection seller). In this way, the risk will not be eliminated but simply transferred to other 
firms that are better equipped to handle it. The possibility to transfer economic risk is linked to 
the  presence  of  a  resilient  and  safe  market  infrastructure,  where  players  provide  sufficient 
collateral and countercyclical requirements against the potential default of the counterparty. The 
use of derivatives in the regular activities of many financial and non-financial institutions has 
                                                       
5 See Swan (2000) for a 4,000 year history of derivatives, dating back to the ancient Middle East. 
6 Recently, the Committee of European Securities Regulators  (CESR) has drawn up a classification of 
these  instruments  as:  options,  warrants,  futures,  contract s  for  difference  and  total  return  swap s, 
spreadbets, swaps, credit default swaps and complex derivatives. See, in general, CESR (2009). SHAPING REFORMS AND BUSINESS MODELS FOR THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET | 3 
also been widespread during the recent financial crisis, as they are essential tools allowing 
investors to hedge against a worldwide market.  
Secondly, derivatives can be a tool to redistribute funding between financial institutions or 
within non-financial institutions in a way that best suits the company‟s financial needs. For 
instance, a financial institution issues coupon bonds and decides to rearrange the payments of 
these periodic coupons with a specific trajectory in order to avoid risks or simply to redistribute 
risks in a certain way.  
Thirdly, derivatives may be also used to speculate on a specific market variable or company 
trend. As stated by Grossman & Stiglitz (1980), “prices reflect the information of informed 
individuals  (arbitrageurs)  but  only  partially,  so  that  those  who  expend  resources  to  obtain 
information do receive compensation”. Speculative use of derivatives thus includes institutions 
or traders who invest in information in order to get higher returns from the market. Their trading 
activity increases the liquidity in the market and – if the information proves to be wrong – 
speculation may potentially favour „noise trading‟,
7 which can only affect prices for a short 
time.
8 In effect, trading against fundamentals is costly, even though it  is possible and in the 
short-run it can be even successful  (De Long et al., 1990)! In the end, noise trading helps to 
create uncertainty on prices, but, at the same time, this leads more uninformed traders to search 
for information (as they will be compen sated), pushing liquidity in the market and  improving 
price  discovery  (the  „equilibrium  of  disequilibrium‟).  Without  speculation  (or  better  called 
„informed  trading‟),  there would  be  no counterparties  for  hedgers.  Speculation  or  informed 
trading is frequently confused with the intent to manipulate market prices, as the border between 
investing to obtain and use outside and visible information has, from a regulatory point of view, 
a „thin‟ border with illegal actions intended to obtain inside and sensible information. Therefore, 
attention should be drawn to the way in which information circulates and how fast it changes in 
ways that can generate advantages for few participants. Regulators and policy-makers should be 
less concerned with the particular use of a product or technique as such. 
Last but not least, using derivatives as a tool for arbitrage facilitates the mechanism of price 
formation, aligning in a short interval of time bid/ask spreads. Arbitrageurs operate with a short 
horizon and are reasonably risk-averse. They aim at making profits without taking relevant 
risks. Their role is limited to making price formation more efficient, while their systemic impact 
is not relevant. Frequently, their behaviour can be seen as a response to noise trading rather than 
as  trading  on  fundamentals  (De  Long  et  al.,  1990).  The  joint  action  of  arbitrageurs  and 
speculators supports markets in reaching their „absorptive capacity‟ (critical level of liquidity).
9 
Derivatives instruments and their multiple uses may  facilitate efficient market functioning and 
the revelation of critical information.
10 In effect, CDS (credit default swap) spreads are widely 
used as a tool for risk management in order to price the credit risk of a specific counterparty.  
3.  Size and shape of the OTC derivatives market  
In the last decade, the OTC derivatives market evolved into the biggest global market, in size 
and interconnection between financial institutions. This market showed an impressive rate of 
                                                       
7 Uninformed investors buying and selling financial securities at irrational prices, thus creating noise 
(strange movements) in the price of securities. 
8 Friedman (1953, p. 175 in De Long et al. [1990]) wrote: “that … speculation is … destabilizing … is 
largely equivalent to saying that speculators lose money, since speculation can be destabilizing in general 
only if speculators on … average sell … low … and buy … high”. 
9 See, in general, Pagano (1989, pp. 255-274). 
10 See, in general, Duffie & Rahi (1995). 4 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
growth in the last decade, reaching its peak in mid-2008 with more than €433 trillion ($680 
trillion)  of  gross  notional  value
11  for outstanding contracts. In effect, the over -the-counter 
derivatives market  grew between  June 2001 and June 2008 by circa 535% at the annual 
weighted average rate of 33.68% (in $).  
Figure 1. Notional value outstanding OTC contracts (€ billion) 
Source: BIS (2009) and ISDA. 
However, the notional value dropped by 20% to around €393 trillion (around $600 trillion) in 
the second half of 2008, as an immediate result of the financial crisis and the reduced activity of 
financial institutions. The downward trend did not last long, however, and in the first half of 
2009 the market started to grow again by 10% to €427 trillion ($604 trillion), confirming its 
systemic importance. In effect, the market has recently demonstrated its impressive ability to 
return to the same level it had reached at the end of 2007. 
The costs of replacement of these contracts (i.e. gross market value) have showed a different 
trend, though. From June to December 2008, it soared by 58.3% to €23 trillion ($32 trillion), as 
consequence of the increased risk due to the financial crisis (risks of adverse selection after 
Lehman‟s default) and the consequent impact on liquidity and market value (see figure above). 
This  acceleration  shows  the  risk  of  high-volatility  of  the  market  value  in  derivatives  (as  a 
„leverage effect‟), due to moves in the underlying markets. By contrast, in the first half of 2009, 
the  gross  market  value  dramatically  bounced  back  by  21%,  due  to  the  recovery  of  the 
underlying markets and the improved global economic outlook. 
                                                       
11 The notional value (or simply „notional‟) consists of the face value of the OTC derivatives contracts, 
while the gross market value is the cost of replacing the contracts at current market prices. The latter is 
calculated by subtracting the market value and redundancies of the OTC contracts to the notional; see BIS 
(2009). In addition, „gross market value‟ figures do not include netted value of positive and negative cost 
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Despite the fact that derivatives typically have a very large notional amount, the real market 
value of their exposure is much lower and, in some cases, it has much less systemic impact than 
expected. For instance, in the credit default swaps (CDSs) market, the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. implied actual net fund transfers from protection sellers to protection 
buyers of only $5.2 billion (notional $72 billion) – a much smaller sum than the huge losses 
posted when Lehman collapsed in September 2008 – and $500 billion in market participants‟ 
exposure from Lehman Brothers on CDSs was successfully closed out.
12 Nevertheless, the rapid 
growth of credit and equity-linked derivatives – in the last five years – may plausibly reflect the 
need for improved market-based mechanisms of signalling risk and risk protection against more 
complex credit exposures (e.g. the use of credit default swaps) and for instruments less volatile 
than equities markets (e.g. equity-linked derivatives). 
Figure 2. OTC derivatives by products (June 2009) 
Foreign exchange 
contracts
8.02%
Interest rate contracts
71.87%
Equity-linked contracts
1.09%
Commodity contracts
1.23%
Credit default swaps
5.93%
Unallocated
11.88%
Source: BIS (2009). 
Statistics from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) show that in the first half of 2009 – 
the worst period of the recent financial crisis – the use of interest rate derivatives increased 
significantly (protection to external factors), while the use of CDSs decreased by circa 14%
13 
(around $36 trillion
14 or €25.5 trillion). This market did not drastically shrink, as centralisation 
of CDS clearing was gradually replacing the current infrastructure. In addition, the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) estimated that the total market value of the circa 
€425 trillion ($600 trillion) in gross notional outstanding OTC derivatives is around $4 trillion, 
after netting and eliminating redundancies.
15 BIS statistics confirm as well that the gross credit 
                                                       
12  See  press  releases  of  the  Depository  Trust  in  Clearing  Corporation  (DTCC),  22  October  2008 
(http://www.dtcc.com/news/newsletters/dtcc/2008/oct/lehman_credit_event.php)  and  30  October  2008 
(http://www.dtcc.com/news/press/releases/2008/dtcc_closes_lehman_cds.php).  
13 The increasing use of complementary services, such as portfolio compression services, may have given 
relevant support to reduce the notional value (see Duffie et al., 2010). 
14 In February 2009, the DTCC reported that the gross notional value of outstanding CDS contracts in its 
data  warehouse  (collecting  circa  90%  of  all  CDS  trades)  was  $25.5  trillion;  see  DTCC 
(http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/data_table_i.php).  
15 These estimates  were published by IOSCO in its last report on unregulated financial markets; see 
IOSCO  (2009).  ISDA  also  releases  data  on  derivatives  on   a  semi-annual  basis  (see 
http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDA-Market-Survey-historical-data.pdf). 6 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
exposure,
16 by the end of June 2009,  was around $4  trillion ($3.7 trillion), excluding CDSs 
traded outside the United States. 
Concerning the market share of financial institutions and the overall concentration rate, US 
insured commercial banks and financial holdings, which represent almost  one-half of the total 
global market for OTC derivatives, slightly increased the total volume of transactions in the first 
half of 2009 (also with more netting activities).
17 Almost all OTC derivatives transactions in the 
US are subscribed by five financial services holdings (and commercial banks) .
18 This aspect 
does not  necessarily  imply  action  from the competition policy side,  since  it needs  deeper 
analysis and a breakdown of data by products. However, the table below provides a valuable 
overall picture of the OTC derivatives markets for its potential implications in terms of financial 
stability. 
Table 1. Overview of the OTC derivatives market (US, EU and global) 
 
Financial institutions 
 
Shares of global OTC 
derivatives market 
(31 Dec 2008; € mil) 
Shares of global OTC 
derivatives market 
(30 June 2009; € mil)  Δ 
US 
JPMorgan Chase  Notional  €61,049,613  14.35%  €54,058,888  12.64%  -11.45% 
Bank of America Corp.  Notional  €26,396,816  6.21%  €50,234,425  11.74%  +90.3% 
Goldman Sachs Group Inc.
a  Notional  €21,366,658  5.02%  €32,472,198  7.59%  +51.98% 
Morgan Stanley  Notional  €40,777,669 
c  9.44%  €27,188,353  6.36%  -33.33% 
Citigroup Inc.  Notional  €21,740,817  5.11%  €21,893,652  5.12%  +0.7% 
  Top 5 institutions  Notional  €171,331,574  40.13%  €185,847,515  43.44%  +8.47% 
  Tot. US OTC derivatives  Notional  €179,886,265  42.14%  €194,419,086  45.45%  +8.08% 
EU 
Deutsche Bank Group 
Notional 
Gross 
€49,189,619 
(notional)  11.56% 
€1,500,211 
(gross)  8.36%  -37.42%
 c 
Barclays Group  Notional  €36,917,079  8.68%  €37,059,196
 d  8.66%  +0.39% 
RBS Group  Gross  €1,958,768
 d  8.04%  €1,220,081
 d  6.8%  -37.71% 
UBS  Notional  €31,096,296  7.31%  €29,820,875
 d  6.97%  -4.1% 
Credit Suisse  Notional  €25,957,778  6.10%  €28,882,280  6.75%  +11.07% 
HSBC Group  Gross  €979,359
 d  4.02%  €679,719
 d  3.79%  -30.6% 
BNP Paribas Group  Notional  €22,536,650  5.30%  n/a  -  - 
  Top 6 EU institutions  -  -  51.02%  -  41.33%  - 
Tot. top US-EU institutions
b  -  -  91.15%  -  84.77%  - 
Tot. global OTC derivatives
b  Gross  €24,350,752  100%  €17,951,003  100%  - 
Tot. global OTC derivatives
b  Notional  €425,352,376  100%  €427,778,185  100%  - 
a By the end of 2008, Goldman Sachs‟ data include only the bank division, not the whole Group. By June 2009, data include the 
whole Group‟s exposure to OTC derivatives. Morgan Stanley was not included in the OCC report, as they did not disclose their 
exposure at the end of 2008. 
b The percentage per institution is a result of the comparison between the values at the date of 31 Dec 2008 for the holding company 
with the notional and gross amount at 31 Dec 2008, as calculated by BIS in May 2009. We did not use the data updated to 
November 2009, as also the single exposure should be updated to November 2009 for the positions held at the end of 2008.  
c Author‟s estimation based on the fair value of OTC derivatives contracts. 
                                                       
16 Gross credit exposure can be defined as the “gross value of contracts that have a positive market value 
after taking account of legally enforceable bilateral netting agreements” (see Cecchetti et al., 2009, p. 57). 
17 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)  – Administrator of National Banks, “OCC‟s 
Quarterly  Report  on  Bank  Trading  and  Derivatives  Activities  –  Second  Quarter  2009”  (available  at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2009-114a.pdf).  
18 See ibid. and Fitch Ratings (2009). SHAPING REFORMS AND BUSINESS MODELS FOR THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET | 7 
d Author‟s estimation of the OTC part from available data. Looking at past data, for RBS and HSBC, we assume that the OTC 
derivatives exposure is the 95% of the total exposure. 
Sources: OCC (2009), BIS (2009) and author‟s own estimations. 
As shown in Table 1, the market for OTC derivatives is still highly concentrated and far bigger 
than the exchange-traded side of the market,
19 with relevant implications in terms of systemic 
risk and financial stability (see below). The concentration of the US OTC derivatives market is 
still  increasing, due to the completion of winding up and acquisitions of relevant financial 
institutions (such as Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch). In the EU, conversely, 
the fragmentation of  derivatives exposures is increasing, and big players, such as Deutsche 
Bank, HSBC and RBS, are drastically reducing their positions in OTC derivatives  in  their 
attempts  to  deal with  the huge losses   they have  suffered  and  state intervention  through 
refocusing their activities around their core retail business. 
4.  Legal and economic views of growth and concentration 
The growth per category has been steady and in line with the background trend (see Figure 2). 
For instance, CDSs have increased at a slightly faster pace in the last four years, but at a lower 
level than that perceived by the public opinion. This implies that the distribution of derivatives 
transactions between the different instruments has remained constant and there is no evidence 
that a particular use of derivatives (such as speculation) has increased in comparison to other 
uses (such as hedging). Legal and economic explanations can be  identified as the rationale 
behind the growth and concentration of the OTC derivatives market.
20 
On the one hand, a legal explanation for the growth of derivatives, arduously defended by Prof. 
Lyn Stout (2009), is the gradual dismantling of the common law rule known as „rule against 
difference‟, which states that the use of derivatives is legal only if parties hold the underlying 
asset. The Financial Services Act of 1986 in the UK and the Commodity Futures Modernization 
Act of 2000 in  the US repealed this binding rule declaring all financial derivatives legally 
enforceable, boosting the uncontrolled growth of  the derivatives market (Stout, 2009). This 
explanation does not seem well-founded as arbitrage between the UK and US markets due to 
this legal discrepancy in such a long time frame (1986-2000) did not occur. Instead, those legal 
acts assured legal certainty and enforceability of contracts to the market, helping parties to 
hedge  against  counterparty  risk  and  to  provide  efficient  information  to  the  market  through 
„informed trading‟ (information revelation). For instance, the most liquid CDS spreads – usually 
on 5-year CDSs – are commonly known as efficient risk management tools. In effect, they are 
widely  used  to  evaluate  and  price  credit  risk,  especially  in  the  banking  sector.  Derivatives 
transactions  executed  without  holding  the  underlying  assets  are  crucial  to  guaranteeing  the 
liquidity of these products and to disseminate material information in the market through the 
impact on spreads of naked „informed‟ transactions. 
On  the  other  hand,  current  capital  requirements  allowed  many  financial  institutions  to 
purposefully accumulate huge positions on some derivatives instruments as a way to reduce 
their  overall  regulatory  capital  (through  the  extensive  use  of  VaR  measures  for  regulatory 
purposes; see Goodhart, 2008; FSA and HM Treasury, 2009). These measures have stimulated 
further growth and concentration in this market. 
                                                       
19  The  White  Paper  drafted  by  Deutsche  Borse  Group  (2009)  estimates  the  notional  outstanding  for 
exchange-traded derivatives being around 10% of the global derivatives market. Our calculations confirm 
this size (9.9%); see ECMI (2009). 
20 On the evolution of OTC markets in the last years, see also Yallop (2008). 8 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
The  economic  justification  of  this  dramatic  expansion  lies  in  the  surge  of  the  underlying 
markets  and  the  improved  mechanisms  for  dealing  with  risks  and  netting  (e.g.  CCP).  The 
growth of the OTC derivatives market is widely recognised as a sign of market innovation – 
which helped to free resources in order to support economic growth – and a tool closely related 
to specific areas of financial markets. For instance, the uncontrolled growth of lending and 
securitisation markets increased the exposure of financial institutions in the market (see Figure 
3), inducing linked markets such as derivatives to increase as well in order to efficiently handle 
risks of these huge positions. The important growth of exposures induced financial firms to 
increase protection through customised derivatives transactions, such as for instance interest rate 
swaps to hedge interest rate fluctuations or credit default swaps to buy insurance in order to 
protect their exposure on CDOs (collateralised debt obligations).  
Figure 3. EU v. US private and public debt over GDP 
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In the last decade, the growth of the private and public debt (see figure above) involved an 
inevitable increase of the exposure to counterparty risk and cash flow management risk (e.g. risk 
of temporary insolvency on their own exposures). Derivatives are an effective tool to manage 
those risks. For instance, a big lending institution may hedge its relevant exposure (e.g. CDOs, 
bond  issuance)  with  a  specific  counterparty  (also  another  financial  institution)  by  buying 
protection through a CDS on the debt or on the reference entity, even in the „naked‟ version. A 
financial institution or government agency would also be willing to purchase a derivative in 
order to smooth in the short run the financial impact on the income statement of a bond issuance 
and to have more liquidity  for immediate investments. Therefore, the impact of public and 
private debt plus the growth of other underlying markets (e.g. commodities) increased the need 
to transfer certain financial risks through instruments  that are mainly designated and traded 
over-the-counter. The use of these instruments amplified interconnections between financial 
institutions, which are frequently transactions involving derivative instruments.  
In  conclusion,  the  increasing  use  of  advanced  netting  and  other  compression  services  has 
reduced the size of the notional value and its impact on financial institutions‟ balance sheets SHAPING REFORMS AND BUSINESS MODELS FOR THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET | 9 
(Duffie et al., 2010).
21 So these services have made it feasible to create huge order books in 
terms of notional value, while the  „real‟ exposure is much less than that. Dealers thus can 
accumulate collateral against the netted value (not the gross value), with a greater possibility to 
increase their share of the market and its concentration. Deutsche Borse Group (2009) estimated 
the impact of netting (excluding cash collateral) on bilateral OTC derivatives exposures at 85% 
and, through the use of CCP, at 99% (for products on-exchanges). Thus, if the amount of the 
notional value is 100, netting can reduce this value to 15 or even to 1. These size-reduction 
services  generate  economies  of  scale  and  lead  end-users  to  deal  with  one  or  only  a  few 
counterparties (making  the  market  become  more  concentrated  in  the  process  through fewer 
dealers), reducing their burdens in the transaction (collateral, capital requirements, etc.) and 
reaping the benefits of centralised solutions (see next section).  
5.  The nature of OTC derivatives transactions  
OTC derivatives transactions typically involve dealers and other financial institutions. Non-
financial institutions represent almost 10% of the market (see figure below), although many of 
them regularly make use of customised derivatives transactions to hedge their core business 
risks (especially with FX derivatives). However, non-financial institutions are a much higher 
percentage of users of derivatives products centrally cleared (around 20%).
22 
Figure 4. Dealers, financial institutions and non-financial institutions 
($ billion, notional outstanding – June 2009) 
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21 ICAP – TriOptima data show that the gross notional value of OTC derivatives terminated between 
2007 and 2009 is $54.7 trillion for credit derivatives and $47 trillion for products based on interest rates. 
In 2009 alone, triReduce has terminated $14.5 trillion of credit derivatives and $25.8 trillion of rates 
derivatives. 
22 See Simon Grensted‟s presentation (LCH.Clearnet) at ECMI seminar, “OTC Derivatives: Catching the 
train  to  centralization”,  20  November  2009 
(http://www.eurocapitalmarkets.org/system/files/ECMI_Grensted_20nov09.pdf).  10 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
Nearly  two-thirds  of  OTC  derivatives  have  a  simple  contract  structure  with  individual 
customisation  (Nystedt,  2004).  Several  risks  are  embedded  in  these  transactions,  with 
potentially disruptive systemic effects due to the interconnectedness of global financial markets 
and  linkages  between  counterparties  (so-called  „cascade  effects‟).  However,  these  financial 
instruments allow the shifting of risks to entities that are better equipped to bear them. 
We  identify  several  economic  risks  and  group  them  into  two  categories:  idiosyncratic  and 
external (see table below).
23 Idiosyncratic risks derive from the nature of counterparties and the 
specific market risk of the underlying variable or financial instrument. All other risks should be 
seen as external to the „pure‟ transaction, even though they may affect the transaction itself. 
Table 2. Economic risks 
Idiosyncratic risks  External risks 
1.  Size and complexity of exposures 
2.  Counterparty credit risk 
3.  Market risks 
4.  Long-term funding 
1.  Collateralisation and transparency of 
transactions and market infrastructures 
2.  Market liquidity 
3.  Legal risks 
4.  Network externalities and cascade effects 
5.  Number of dealers and/or CCPs 
6.  Clearing and settlement risks (confirmation 
backlogs, etc.) 
7.  Custodial risks (e.g. Lehman Brothers) 
 
On the one side, the group of idiosyncratic risks includes those fuelled by the characteristics of 
the transaction and market participants, as well as their market risk.  
  Lack of transparency on the overall transaction or on real counterparty‟s financial exposures 
(not  only  to  derivatives)  may  increase  the  overall  risk,  as  strategic  decisions  in  the 
company‟s  business  activity  may  affect  the  resiliency  of  the  derivative  transaction  (i.e. 
counterparty credit risk). More attention, then, should be given to the use of derivatives 
instruments to speculate on specific firms through inside information (IOSCO, 2009).  
  The derivative transaction typically involves a long-term contractual relationship where the 
buyer‟s benefits (which represent liability for the derivative‟s seller) are immediate, while 
the remuneration for the seller of the product is often diluted over a long-term period.
24 In 
the long run, the counterparty risk is higher, only because there  is a higher probability that 
things may deteriorate for a currently healthy firm.  
  Counterparty default may involve huge systemic risks, due to the high concentration  of 
bilateral  exposures  (knock-on  effects),  information  asymmetries,  the  cost  of  replacing 
contracts or strong bilateral interconnections (Bliss & Papathanassiou, 2006). In addition, if 
a big financial institution defaults, residual derivatives transactions should be re-priced to 
replace  current  trades.  As  described  below,  this  replacement  cost  is  very  high,  so 
opportunistic behaviour should be taken into account, as the healthy party will be led to 
terminate in-the-money contracts and keep alive out-of-money contracts during bankruptcy 
procedures (Singh & Aitken, 2009). The solvent party thus may hold up the insolvent party 
                                                       
23 See Darby (1994) and Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1994). 
24 Interest rate swaps can be liquid for maturities up to 30 years; see BIS (2007). SHAPING REFORMS AND BUSINESS MODELS FOR THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET | 11 
in  order  to  obtain  more  favourable  terms  from  re-pricing  contracts.  In  this  respect,  the 
creation of efficient crisis management and default procedures is paramount.  
  The  mismatch  between  long-term  funding  and  short-term  liabilities  has  put  derivatives 
dealers in a potentially risky situation when the financial crisis impacted on counterparties 
and indirectly on the mechanisms of margins and collateral used to seal the system from 
counterparty default.  
  Market risks, then, include risks related to the underlying assets, such as price movements, 
volatility, leverage, rate of discount and liquidity (Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1994).  
On the other side, the external risks belong to the broader set of the legal framework of rules 
and market infrastructure. For instance, a gap in transparency rules or confirmation backlogs 
can create uncertainty on the exact terms of the trade and increase costs and length of litigation 
in case of disagreement.  
  The low number of dealers and/or central counterparty (CCP) clearing, then, may affect the 
transaction as long as it determines a scarcely competitive and concentrated environment 
that impacts on the quality and resilience of the transaction.  
  As these large exposures are shared between a reduced number of interdependent financial 
institutions, a more pervasive control of the cascade effects (or knock-on effects; ECB, 
2009) is paramount in case the operations of one or a few players are disrupted. In effect, 
derivative  transactions  may  involve  systemic  risks  through  cascade  effects  and  network 
externalities – as they are backed by an intricate web of financial links and transactions – 
which can hamper seemingly resilient transactions.   
  Due to its high customisation and complexity, the market for OTC derivatives is constantly 
under  the  threat  of  market  illiquidity  or  an  insufficiently  deep  market  (so-called 
„replacement cost risk‟).  
  Only a resilient market infrastructure and clearing services can deal with the mismatch 
between exposure and counterparty risk (European Commission, 2009b). Counterparty risk 
needs,  therefore,  to  be  monitored  on  a  daily  basis,  through  the  direct  management  of 
margins requirements and if necessary requesting daily or every few days the injection of 
collateral. In general, the long maturity of some derivatives transactions further exposes 
counterparties  to  their  own  credit  risk.  The  use  of  margins  requirements  and/or  capital 
requirements is crucial to reduce the impact of this category of risk. 
  Other  external  risks  are  related  to  the  process  of  clearing,  settlement  and  custody. 
Operational  and  legal  risks  (e.g.  the  Herstatt  risk),  which  are  typically  limited,  may 
undermine the whole transaction (see below for more details).  
Finally, on the legal side, OTC derivatives transactions involve a consistent framework of legal 
rules. In effect, the trade is based on a contractual agreement, which requires a well-drafted text 
in  order  to  avoid  confirmation  delays  or  lengthy  and  costly  litigations,  thereby  reducing 
transaction  costs  (and  increasing  standardisation).  The  ISDA  master  agreement,  novation 
protocol,  close-out  procedures  and  small  or  big  bang  protocols  are  examples  of  widely 
recognised practices and contractual models adopted by the industry to improve operations and 
better manage procedures in OTC transactions. In effect, legal uncertainty can undermine the 
transaction  through  „unforeseen‟  margins  and  collateral  calls  that  may  threaten  companies‟ 
balance sheets. Legal risks can hamper the orderly functioning of the markets.  
Two legal instruments are widely adopted in OTC contracts to reduce transaction costs and 
indirectly mitigate operational, infrastructure and counterparty risk: novation and the master 
agreements (standard contract). Their use increases the standardisation of the transaction and 12 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
improves the process of offsetting a specific transaction with an equivalent one (netting), as well 
as increasing the transparency of the real exposure of a specific counterparty. For instance, 
novation allows the substitution of a contract with a new one or two new contracts.
25 This legal 
tool is used to move contracts on a Central Counterparty Clearing (CCP) for OTC or „exchange-
traded derivatives‟ (same legal step as explained below). Thus, through novation, the CCP or in 
general the  new  obligor can  proceed  with  several  other  activities,  which  potentially  reduce 
counterparty and operational risks (multilateral netting, portfolio reconciliation services, close-
out procedures etc.). In effect, the new contract between the counterparty and the platform will 
define a new set of rules, which include CCP membership rules.  
Other concerns come from the uncertainty on the legal rules applied to these contracts, which 
are drafted and executed in diverse jurisdictions. In specific cases of litigation or a failure of the 
CCP or other relevant circumstances, a uniform application of global standards across countries 
that clearly define the regulatory regime applied to contracts would be a welcome and efficient 
solution. The High Court of England and Wales recently rejected a plea from Morgan Stanley 
that  the  dispute  over  a  derivatives  transaction  should  be  heard  only  in  the  jurisdiction 
established  in  the  Master  Agreement  (in  this  case,  England).
26  As  a  consequence,  the 
counterparty sued Morgan Stanley also in its own country of origin, in this case for mis -selling 
practices, although the contract defines England as an established jurisdiction. This is a typical 
example  of  legal  risk  posed  by  derivatives  transactions.  In  conclusion,  a  strengthened 
supranational  supervision  and  global  regulatory  standards  to  be  implemented  by  main 
jurisdictions should at least partially comp ensate the potential risk of a „race to the bottom‟ 
between national regulators. 
6.  Shedding light on the OTC derivatives’ chain value: A cost-
benefit analysis 
A  derivatives  transaction  involves  several  steps  and  a  long-time  horizon,  starting  from  the 
contractual agreement and moving to the final settlement and transaction termination (see figure 
below). In effect, the aim of bargaining over derivatives is often to spread out the payments to 
complete the transaction on a long-term basis for the purposes mentioned above, increasing 
particularly the clearing, settlement and counterparty risks. 
Under the four categories mentioned in the figure (i.e. trading, clearing, settlement and custody), 
it is possible to identify six different phases: 
1.  Pre-trade (collection of documentation, and contractual agreement on terms) 
2.  Trade execution 
3.  Pre-clearing (verification/matching, confirmation, and novation) 
4.  Clearing (netting, collateral/margin management, cash flow matching, termination services) 
5.  Settlement (cash or physical delivery)  
6.  Custody (trade registration, assets segregation, and in some cases collateral management) 
 
                                                       
25 For a more accurate description, see Bliss & Papathanassiou (2006). 
26  See  Financial  Times,  “Morgan  Stanley  battles  over  China  derivatives”,  28  October  2009 
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e222bd1a-c3f7-11de-8de6-00144feab49a.html). SHAPING REFORMS AND BUSINESS MODELS FOR THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET | 13 
Figure 5. OTC derivatives transaction 
 
Source: Author‟s elaboration. 
These trade-related activities, then, can be supported by complementary services, such as prime 
brokerage  or  portfolio  services,  or  supporting  institutions,  e.g.  a  data  repository  (or  trade 
information warehouse), in order to increase market transparency and resilience. For instance, 
prime brokerage services are offered to buy-side investors (e.g. hedge funds) in order to create a 
single  point  of  access  to  the  market  for  OTC  derivatives  (but  using  multiple  dealers)  and 
facilitating clearing and settlement arrangements (CPSS, 2007). The prime broker intermediates 
between dealer and investor, and if the transaction is accepted and confirmed, it will become 
counterparty  to  two  trades,  being  simultaneously  buyer  and  seller  of  the  trade.  This 
supplementary service aims at reducing operational costs and increasing efficiency.  
6.1  Pre-trade 
The pre-trade phase – after preliminary talks – includes the drafting and compilation of several 
documents  such  as  the  master  agreement  form,  the  schedule  with  modifications  and 
confirmation forms with details of the trade. Then, parties collect all these documents plus, if 
requested,  annexes  with  guarantees  and  pledge  agreements.  This  phase  thus  consists  of  1) 
designing the transactions around parties‟ needs and risks and 2) drafting a master agreement 
that minimises legal uncertainty and transaction costs. However, this phase may also take place 
orally.  Bespoke  (highly  customised)  transactions  increase  legal  uncertainty  and  the  risk  of 
litigation, as the pre-trade is limited to preliminary talks and less to designing an efficient and 
accurate  master  agreement  (it  is  only  a  verbal  agreement).  The  risk  concerns  the 
unenforceability of bespoke transactions in specific countries. Benefits, instead, rely on the 
speed of execution and the possibility to handle in a highly customised way the modification of 
transaction details or to hedge an outstanding position in a short time frame. 14 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
6.2  Trade execution 
This  phase  is  not  particularly  crucial  in  the  value  chain,  as  OTC  derivatives  are  bilateral 
agreements. Thus, parties have already defined the terms and conditions when the trade needs to 
be  executed  along  the  details  set  in  the  agreed  documentation.  When  the  broker-dealer 
intermediates for other parties, the execution of the trade may take longer and be more complex. 
In effect, the interdealer broker may need to find one or more counterparties in order to execute 
the  order.  On  the  operational  side,  more  should  be  done  to  implement  straight-through 
processing of transactions. However, even if electronic systems and automation are more widely 
adopted, voice services are still in use and play an important role for customised positions, as 
they mix advice and a highly-customised execution service in one place in real time.  
6.3  Pre-clearing  
Once counterparties have agreed on the terms of a transaction, before clearing it, these details 
are captured, verified and confirmed, in order to avoid as much uncertainty as possible and thus 
reduce  the  probability  of  future  costly  disputes.  In  effect,  unconfirmed  trades  (or  verbally 
confirmed ones) reduce the likelihood of enforceability for the transaction and do not allow 
multilateral  netting  by  CCPs,  increasing  therefore  counterparty  and  operational  risks  (ECB, 
2009).  
In the pre-clearing phase, the trade is verified and confirmed. This phase ensures that trading 
parties  are  in  agreement  about  essential  trade  details,  such  as  the  deal  price,  trade  date, 
settlement  details,  etc.  (Oxera,  2008).  It  can  be  executed  electronically  or  manually.  The 
verification is actually done after the execution note, in order to verify that the details of the 
trade between parties are the same as the ones originally set by them. Parties thus exchange the 
details of the transaction, as they have been registered in their systems. Once exchanged, the 
confirmation of the details may follow one of two models: trade matching or trade affirmation 
(CPSS, 2007).  
Trade matching is used when both parties prepare a confirmation form that they are going to 
match in order to eliminate errors and discrepancies in the details set by parties.  
Trade affirmation consists of one party giving the trade details to the other, who is finally going 
to verify the information and proceed with the agreed trade. 
Although the market has been working to reduce the number of unconfirmed outstanding trades, 
more should be done to push the percentage of confirmed trades within the trading day plus one 
business  day  (T+1)  close  to  100%,
27  through the support of automated and interoperable 
systems (CPSS-IOSCO, 2001 and ESCB-CESR, 2009). In 2009, the level of unconfirmed trades 
went down for all categories, except for currenc y derivatives, which  experienced a slight 
increase. The monthly average of business days for outstanding confirmations is roughly 5.5 -6 
days for all OTC derivatives in 2009, while in 2008  it was more or less 9 days (ISDA, 2009). 
OTC credit derivatives have reached a high level of electronic confirmation (92%) with almost 
96% confirmed within T+2 and T+5. For all categories, electronic confirmation is mainly 
completed within T+2 and T+5 (except for equity derivatives), while for manual confirmations 
the time for completion ranges between T+6 and T+30 (see Table 3 below). In addition, some 
0.1% to 0.7% of trades still remain unconfirmed after 180 days.  
                                                       
27 Electronic platforms run by external players can ensure high percentages of confirmed trades. For 
instance, Markit Wire has succeeded in confirming 95% of interest rate swaps on the same day, and it 
aims at replicating or increasing this percentage for all OTC derivatives through a joint venture with 
DTCC, so-called „MarkitSERV‟; see Markit, “Comments on ESCB/CESR Draft Recommendations for 
Central Counterparties for OTC derivatives”, 16 April 2009. SHAPING REFORMS AND BUSINESS MODELS FOR THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET | 15 
Table 3. Confirmation times 
Confirmed trades 
(circa %) within  Same day  T+1  T+2  T+5 
T+6 
T+10 
T+16 
T+30 
T+30 or 
more 
Electronic     
Credit (92%)  62%  92%  96%  100%  -  - 
Commodities (46%)  60%  97%  97%  100%  -  - 
Currency (51%)  88%  100%  -  -  -  - 
Interest rate (48%)  68%  100%  -  -  -  - 
Equity (23%)  39%  81%  92%  100%  -  - 
Non-electronic or manual 
Credit (8%)  15%  50%  60%  95%  97%  99%  100% 
Commodities (54%)  14%  68%  80%  94%  95%  99%  100% 
Currency (49%)  27%  77%  83%  88%  96%  99%  100% 
Interest rate (52%)  8%  48%  72%  92%  98%  98%  100% 
Equity (77%)  8%  27%  40%  75%  92%  96%  100% 
Source: ISDA Operations Benchmarking Survey (2009). 
Automated trade verification and confirmation, especially on the same day of the trade (T+0), 
may concretely generate direct and indirect benefits, increasing the overall efficiency of the 
OTC derivatives market‟s back office and reducing settlement failures (Oxera, 2008). More 
market initiatives should be encouraged in order to invest more in electronic mechanisms of 
verification and confirmation, as well as in a straight-through processing (STP) of transactions. 
The  time  of  confirmation  should  not  be  strategically  defined  by  the  firm  but  it  should  be 
monitored and guided by regulators or international self-regulated bodies, through guidelines 
and/or incentives, in order to reduce the time of outstanding confirmation for the vast majority 
of  these  trades  to  T+1.  The  pre-clearing  phase,  therefore,  plays  a  pivotal  role  in  the  OTC 
derivatives  market,  since  –  without  confirmation  –  trades  may  be  unenforceable,  with 
destabilising effects on the viability of one or both counterparties. For instance, the transaction 
(in this case, without confirmation) may not be shielded from creditors‟ claims in insolvency 
procedures. 16 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
 
Box 1. The role of „standardisation‟ 
Standardisation is a general concept that refers to specific technical processes, economic terms 
and  legal  terms  of  a  financial  product,  to  allow  straight-through  processing  (STP)  of  the 
transaction. On the one hand, OTC derivatives markets may benefit from standardised products 
as they permit a complete control of the chain value through electronic trading, clearing and 
settlement systems. On the other, not all derivative transactions can be standardised.  
Three levels of standardisation can be defined (European Commission, 2009e): 
1.  Contract and legal standardisation, 
2.  Product standardisation (economic terms, e.g. payment structure and dates) and 
3.  Technical standardisation. 
Wide adoption of uniform contracts (such as master agreements) helps to standardise the value 
chain, thereby allowing an STP (FSA and HM Treasury, 2009). In effect, on the one hand, 
common forms of master agreements reduce transaction costs and harmonise procedural details, 
consistently reducing expensive legal disputes and helping to smooth the legal process. On the 
other  hand,  standardised  economic  terms  and  automation  promote  a  smooth  economic  and 
technical process of the transaction.  
Nevertheless, even in highly standardised products, customisation can still be preserved for some 
economic terms, as long as customisation does not affect the STP of derivatives products. Most 
customised products need customised processing, which frequently requires non-STP procedures 
through manual or voice execution. 
Product standardisation, therefore, assumes a uniform language for economic terms, while the 
individual risk profile may not be captured by a specific standardised language for economic 
terms (see the figure below). Pressure for standardisation should, therefore, be exerted on the 
determinants of the legal terms and systems automation, namely harmonisation and investments 
in infrastructure. 
Standardisation 
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In  effect,  as  shown  above,  harmonisation  of  rules  at  global  level  may  push  contract 
standardisation, thereby smoothing the legal process. Contract standardisation is affected and 
affects  automation  and  economic  terms.  On  the  one  hand,  standardisation  of  the  master 
agreement affects automation through the fact that a trade frequently can only be confirmed by 
written consent; therefore electronic systems need to change their parameters and architecture to 
comply with this legal rule. The widespread use of digital signatures may drastically reduce the 
length of time of confirmation, promoting a smoother process. However, written consent is not 
legally binding in all countries, so more should be done through harmonisation to support this 
legal  standardisation  process.  Nevertheless,  technical  standardisation  will  affect  legal 
standardisation as master agreements are usually drafted in a standardised language and format, 
in order to enter the contract in the electronic system more quickly and easily. On the other hand, 
contract standardisation shapes economic terms, as parties may opt for a specific day as the 
starting date of the contract, if only for legal reasons.  
Economic terms may then influence legal standards. For instance, novation is a widespread legal 
tool designed to allow multilateral netting, thereby satisfying an important economic need such 
as the minimisation of transaction flows. Then, economic terms shape legal terms, as they are 
directly correlated. The contract is designed around the economic terms of the transaction. 
The same links can be identified for the technical standardisation of a derivatives transaction. 
Automation  impacts  on  contract  standardisation  and  vice  versa,  as  already  explained  above. 
Economic  terms,  conversely,  are  influenced  by  technical  standardisation,  for  example,  by 
choosing a currency or a clearing solution that allows further automation, even though it implies 
in  the  end  slightly  different  economic  conditions.  Technical  standards  may  change  as  the 
economic terms of the transaction may be easily satisfied through automated systems or through 
the use of a voice or manual execution system.  
Finally, legal standardisation can be promoted through globally harmonised rules. More technical 
standardisation can be achieved through large investments in technologies and infrastructure. 
Product  standardisation,  however,  is  only  partially  achievable,  as  economic  needs  cannot  be 
standardised. In effect, the risk profile and appetite are linked to the individual nature of the 
financial  institution.  In  any  case,  the  interaction  between  legal,  economic  and  technical 
standardisation of the process allows an STP and, in the end, a standardised transaction. 
Categories of products 
 
Source: Author‟s elaboration. 18 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
 
 
6.4  Clearing 
Once verified and confirmed, the trade reaches a crucial point in its lifecycle. Clearing has been 
defined as: 
... the link between trading and settlement in which the obligations of each party to a 
transaction are finalised, that is, the process of transmitting, reconciling and confirming 
payment orders (or security transfer instructions) prior to settlement, possibly including 
the  netting  of  instructions  and  the  establishment  of  final  positions  for  settlement 
(NERA, 2007, p. 9). 
Clearing services, therefore, support the smooth processing of trades between execution and 
settlement.  However,  their  complexity  is  much  higher  for  OTC  derivatives  than  for  other 
securities, as clearing services must support the trade during the entire (usually long) process of 
a derivatives contract, from execution to final settlement (Glass, 2009). This phase includes a 
great variety of value-adding clearing services, in addition to the basic services performed in the 
pre-clearing process (Hasenpusch, 2009). These services are: 
1.  Netting, 
2.  Risk and collateral management and 
3.  Cash management. 
Netting, in economic terms,  
means the calculation of a single sum representing the potential result of the actual or 
notional discharge of two or more claims for payment that two persons have against 
each other (Crawford, 1993, p. 163). 
Netting activities play a pivotal role from both a micro and macro point of view. On the one 
hand, from a macro point of view, they help to align the overall amounts, through bilateral or 
multilateral (CCP) netting, with the real exposure that counterparties may potentially suffer. On 
Therefore, not all OTC derivatives can be standardised (e.g. bespoke transactions, which are 
indispensable tools for non-financial participants), while not all standardised products are eligible 
for central clearing, since further requirements must be met to access platforms, such as CCPs 
(see sections below). In effect, to access central clearing, clearing members need to comply with 
strict requirements related to the participant and not to the product, in order to keep the platform 
stable. In addition, there are other aspects to assess (FSA, 2009b): 
1.  Regular availability of prices, 
2.  Sufficient depth of market liquidity and 
3.  Absence of risks that the CCP cannot mitigate. 
International currency swaps illustrate this point: they can be standardised but they are preferably 
cleared  bilaterally,  mainly  for  risks  that  the  CCP  cannot  mitigate  (e.g.  settlement  risks).  In 
addition, not all standardised products are vanilla products and vice versa: vanilla characteristics 
mainly  concern  economic  terms  (see  Figures  1  and  2),  whereas  standardisation  requires  the 
convergence  of  economic,  legal  and  technical  terms.  Simplifying  the  transaction  helps 
standardisation but it is not a determinant. Vanilla products, instead, can be more easily classified 
as eligible products for centralised clearing, as their risk lends itself to centralised management 
of the risk. Some 2/3 of OTC derivatives are simple vanilla products (Nystedt, 2004).  SHAPING REFORMS AND BUSINESS MODELS FOR THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET | 19 
the other hand, this activity reduces uncertainty and supports risk and collateral management at 
the micro level.  
In legal terms, netting has no definition, being purely an economic activity. However, the legal 
framework required to enforce these procedures is based on different legal concepts (Crawford, 
1993). First of all, the concept of setoff, i.e. mutual debts between parties can be offset to reduce 
the debt to a net amount. This concept is widely recognised in the jurisprudence and global legal 
systems (in the UK, from the 18
th century), but the legal reasons behind this procedure are 
simply intended to protect one of the parties from exploitation by the other by not paying the 
correspondent transaction. It gives to the creditor a preference over the creditor‟s claims in 
bankruptcy  procedures.
28  This  rule  then  has  been  largely  adopted,  due  to  the  systemic 
importance of  the derivatives market. Therefore, on one hand, netting activities need to be 
legally recognised across countries in order to enforce these economically valuable services, 
especially in case of insolvency procedures where there is a need to protect the transaction 
(especially cash collateral) from creditors‟ claims (in addition to collateral segregation).
29 For 
instance, since 1982, the United States has had to amend its bankruptcy code (11 USCA §362; 
last amendment in 2005) several times  in order to allow the set -off of mutual debts in this 
specific circumstance.
30 On the other hand, however, derivativ es transactions can be used to 
circumvent the law in order to protect the transaction from insolvency procedures. For instance, 
it is possible to extend a loan through a total return swap, instead of a conventional loan 
agreement that would put the financial institution in the queue with other creditors‟ claims for 
repayment.
31 
There are several techniques to provide bilateral netting services (Behof, 1993): novation, close-
out, payment and by cross-product netting. 
Novation is the transfer of the legal obli gation linked to the OTC derivatives transaction from 
one of the original parties to a third party, called  a transferee. The transfer is only possible 
through a new contract, and both original parties have to agree on it. Although novation 
procedures have a legal nature and need to be recognised by the legal system of the country 
where the transaction takes place,
32 the relevant effect of this operation is largely economic. In 
effect, novation is the tool that allows a central counterparty clearing (CCP) net ting trades on a 
multilateral basis.  
Novation is what distinguishes a CCP from a clearinghouse. The latter, in effect, performs only 
bilateral netting, interposing it between two or more counterparties in order to give parties only 
one point of interaction, but without assuming any risk on its own in the transaction (it does not 
bear market risk as a CCP potentially does; see Dale, 1998). The alternatives to novation can be 
open offers or guarantee schemes (Bliss  & Papathanassiou, 2006). The former consists of an 
offer for eligible securities made by the CCP to eligible clearing members in order to attract a 
                                                       
28 See Re/Max Metro-City Realty Ltd. v. Baker (Trustee of) (1993), 16 C.B.R. (3d) 308 (Ont. Ct. (Gen 
Div.)) in Canada. 
29 A famous US case law, Beverly Hills Sav. v. Renault Acceptance B.V. No. C-549-684 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
May 30, 1985), impeded Renault from terminating a swap contract and selling a bankrupt party's 
collateral to satisfy debt. 
30 A specific section (§560) was added to the bankruptcy code in 1990 and amended in 2005; see  Pub.L. 
101-311, Title I, § 106(a), June 25, 1990, 104 Stat. 268, and amended  Pub.L. 109-8, Title IX, § 907(j), 
(o)(10), Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 178, 182. 
31 See The Economist, “Over the counter, out of sight”, 12 November 2009. 
32  In addition, there is a protocol made by ISDA in order to standardise this operation and avoid 
unconfirmed trades. The obligation to r eceive the written consent to the novation from the remaining 
party is the main reason why a big part of trades remain unconfirmed.  20 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
defined number of transactions on the CCP (after matching trades details). Once terms have 
been accepted, parties will terminate the contracts and a new contract with the CCP will be 
drawn up. It is usually used to deal with trading facilities as exchange central order books or 
alternative trading platforms. The latter, instead, implies no direct exposure to the defaulting 
party, but guarantees directly act on the contracts in order to avoid knock-on effects in case the 
market participant fails. Multilateral netting occurs when the CCP proceeds with the set-off of 
all  the  positions  with  its  counterparties  (after  novation)  in  order  to  reduce  the  outstanding 
residuals to one single debt/credit flow between the transferor and the CCP (transferee). The 
value of multilateral netting increases with the number of transactions in the market, as the 
benefit  of  reducing  the  complexity  of  the  huge  web  of  bilateral  exposures  increases 
(Hasenpusch, 2009). 
Cancellation and close-out netting are procedures that terminate the derivative transaction – 
when a credit event occurs – with a pre-defined payment (non-executory contracts) or marked-
to-market netting of reciprocal payments (executory contracts; see Bliss & Kaufman, 2005). For 
instance, it may happen when one of the two parties defaults or receives a downgrade. The 
termination,  therefore,  protects  against  cherry-picking  by  counterparties,  for  example,  in 
insolvency procedures. However, the value of the transaction or of the final payment is usually 
determined by the solvent counterparty. This increases the risk of future litigation, even though 
termination  avoids  unexpected  consequences  that  can  undermine  the  economic  viability  of 
solvent financial institutions (knock-on effects). It is crucial, therefore, that counterparties agree 
on the methodology to be adopted if a close-out event occurs. Without close-out, however, the 
risk of being „locked up‟ in the OTC derivatives transaction is high, as long as the market 
moves against the solvent party. In this case, the viability of the solvent counterparty may 
potentially be under threat. If the market was already against the solvent party, a sudden close-
out and the request to the solvent party to inject more liquidity may affect its financial stability. 
The  crucial  role  of  close-out,  as  a  netting  and  terminating  procedure,  is  confirmed  by  its 
widespread  use in  the  OTC  derivatives  market.  Currently,  circa  85% of  master  agreements 
contain a close-out procedure.
33 If recognised in the legal jurisdiction, it is the tool that allows 
an efficient use of collateralisation measures (transactions can account on a net basis). There are 
also alternatives to close-out, such as selling books of OTC derivatives to a solvent counterparty 
when one is available or receiving guarantees from the insolvency administrator, which may 
have no legal basis and give parties the wrong incentives and scarce monitoring powers (moral 
hazard). 
Payment and cross-product netting are largely used in bilateral netting of OTC derivatives 
transactions. The former method is an exchange of payments based on an unwritten agreement, 
but this sometimes raises legal complications. The latter method tries to net across products (i.e. 
exposures to different products). In this case, legal (and economic) complications may emerge 
from the potential lack of homogeneity between the object of the two obligations and  from 
problems in assessing the right amount to net, with the risk of expensive and long litigation. 
The process of associating positions, managed by clearing players, with a specific inherent risk 
is called risk management (Hasenpusch, 2009). Procedures of risk management should be 
adequately supported by appropriate  safeguard provisions and tools.  We can identify a list of 
safeguards that may be adopted by a CCP or bilateral clearers to manage specific risks (see table 
below). 
 
                                                       
33 Data provided by Richard Metcalfe (ISDA) at ECMI seminar, “OTC Derivatives: Catching the train to 
centralization”,  20  November  2009 
(http://www.eurocapitalmarkets.org/system/files/ECMI_Grensted_20nov09.pdf). SHAPING REFORMS AND BUSINESS MODELS FOR THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET | 21 
Table 4. Safeguards for managing risk 
CCP  Bilateral 
  Capital and minimum financial 
requirements from clearing members 
  Margin and collateral requirements 
  Defaulter‟s funds  
  Other safeguards (such as CCP‟s funds and 
capital insurance) 
  Minimum financial requirements 
  Margin and collateral requirements 
  Other requirements (e.g. independent 
amounts and capital charges) 
 
Margin and collateral requirements consist of a set of resources used to mitigate credit risk in a 
financial transaction. These tools entail several procedures, such as periodically measuring the 
value of the collateral that should be provided for the derivative transaction and determining 
final haircuts (Bliss & Steigerwald, 2006). For instance, CCPs usually adopt initial and variation 
margins.  The  former  is  used  as  the  primary  protection  against  a  transaction‟s  failure  and 
immediate risk of non-performance. The latter, instead, can periodically change (e.g. on a daily 
basis) in order to link credit risk to the current market value of the transaction. This updating, 
for obvious reasons of costs, is not continuous, but is usually done at agreed intervals of time. 
CCPs  perform  this  activity  through  one  or  more  margin  calls  (or  release if collateral  is  in 
excess)  during  the  trading  day.  In  addition,  as  described  below,  CCPs  also  provide  other 
safeguards such as default funds and capital insurance. 
The amount of collateral used for bilateral OTC derivatives transactions has been constantly 
growing in the last three years. In 2009, in particular, it almost doubled, peaking at $4 trillion, 
while 66% of credit exposures to OTC derivatives are fully collateralised. Currently, 78% of all 
OTC  derivatives  transactions  are  covered  by  collateral  arrangements  (ISDA,  2010b),  even 
though  there  is  no  legal  obligation  to  provide  credit  risk  mitigation  measures  (such  as 
collateralisation). At present, 83.5% of collateral is composed of cash and 16.5% of pledged 
securities  (9%  government  securities  and  7.5%  other  securities;  see  ISDA  Margin  Survey, 
2009). However, on one hand, if cash collateral permits the partial hedging of credit risk with 
the most liquid asset, on the other, it gives more uncertainty because, once delivered to the 
counterparty, its traceability may become an issue in case of bankruptcy. Pledged securities, 
instead,  are  easily  retrievable  in  default  procedures  (Behof,  1993).  Then,  an  insufficiently 
meditated increase of margin requirements can reverse the current normal trend or activity of 
the firm, which may be called upon to inject high amounts of collateral without holding or 
having  the  possibility  to  access  it  on  short  notice.  In  effect,  efficient  collateral  agreements 
should  require  daily  calculations  and  calling/returning  of  collateral.  Collateral  arrangements 
therefore play a crucial role in bilateral transactions. However, there is no legal obligation by 
the collateral taker to segregate the amount received – even if it is in excess to the amount 
required as additional collateral (independent amount) – and the collateral provider does not 
have any proprietary interest in the collateral itself, while the collateral taker receives full legal 
and beneficial ownership in the collateral (ISDA, 2010b). This situation may create problems on 
the legal protection of these assets, especially in case of bankruptcy (e.g. Lehman Brothers). 
Asset  segregation  through  third  parties  should  be  foreseen  by  legal  jurisdictions  for  initial 
margins and independent amounts (over-collateralisation), in order to protect the assets from 
external risks and to preserve the financial viability of the involved parties (also minimising the 
number of litigations). Asset segregation can be done in several ways, but it will be necessary to 
update  ISDA  Credit  Support  Annexes  as  well  as  the  legal  opinions  endorsed  by  relevant 
jurisdictions (ISDA, 2010a). Variation margins, instead, may need flexibility to deal with daily 
calculations  and  calls/returns  and  they  should  not  be  eventually  segregated.  In  addition, 
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collateralisation  of  transactions,  as  the  default  fund  available  in  a  CCP  environment.  The 
provision  of  independent  amounts  is  foreseen  by  bilateral  agreements.  There  is  no  legal 
obligation to provide such resources to mitigate credit risk. 
In conclusion, we have identified an array of services used to manage cash resources for netting, 
collateral and other purposes that are involved in clearing OTC derivatives transactions (e.g. 
cash payments). These services play a crucial role in the economics of a derivatives transaction, 
as  they  are  indispensable  tools  for  handling  enormous  flow  of  transactions  and  meeting 
customised risk needs.  
6.5  Central counterparty clearing: Benefits and risks for the OTC 
derivatives market 
A  central  counterparty  clearing  (CCP)  “interposes  itself  between  counterparties  to  a  trade, 
becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. ... the credit risk of the CCP is 
substituted with the credit risk of the other participants” (CPSS-IOSCO, 2004, p. 6; ESCB-
CESR, 2009, p. 33). The CCP‟s role consists of managing counterparty risks in derivatives 
transactions, which may be seen as market risk once clearing services have shaped and added 
the transaction in the huge basket managed by a CCP. In fact, clearing services transform credit 
risk into market risk and CCPs manage it through the straight-through processing (STP) of 
transaction (mainly default management, price transparency and liquidity). 
Figure 6. Bilateral-Clearinghouse-CCP Clearing 
 
Source: Author. 
As shown in the figure above, CCPs differ from  clearinghouses,  in that they assume some 
transaction risk in their operations (and indirectly move it on to clearing members). In effect, 
novating  every  eligible  transaction  involves  risks  due  to  unconfirmed  trades  and  backlogs. 
Novation, however, allows consistent reduction of transaction flows and payments, while both 
clearinghouses and CCPs provide a great advantage in comparison to bilateral transactions, as 
they become the only transaction point for their own members. In this way, when the number of 
transactions is really high, counterparties will reduce transaction costs using platforms as CCPs 
to net or to deal with other clearing services, such as single transaction points, instead of dealing 
with many counterparties. The CCP allows centralisation of the credit risk, which will be borne 
by the whole network around the CCP. Therefore, the more liquid the market, the more efficient 
it is to have centralised network solutions, such as a CCP or a clearinghouse. Furthermore, 
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downstream  market  (settlement),  a  CCP  cannot  be  considered  an  essential  facility,  as  it  is 
replicable by other financial firms (Whish, 2005). 
CCPs bring, under specific assumptions (e.g. market liquidity), many benefits: 
  Multilateral  netting.  In  effect,  novation  allows  CCPs  simultaneous  powerful  netting  of 
positions between many counterparties; this reduces operational and counterparty risks on 
the single clearing member, but at the same time this activity makes it easier to exit the 
market and close positions if a firm no longer desires to take a position through derivative 
transactions; finally, it reduces procyclicality, as multilateral netting implies less use of 
collateral and reduced risks of sudden injections of collateral due to rating downgrades. 
  Counterparty risk management. CCPs usually offer best practices for collateral and margin 
requirements with daily calls and initial margins, plus other safeguards, e.g. default fund; 
however, CCPs do not eliminate counterparty risk but they just mitigate and redistribute it 
in a more efficient way, through the mechanisms of safeguard and mutualisation of losses. 
  Reduced spill-over effects. CCPs set crisis management rules and specific procedures in 
case  of  default  of  a  clearing  member,  which  should  be  regularly  tested  (ESCB-CESR, 
2009). As a last resort, after taken into account all the defaulter‟s resources, CCPs may 
mutualise  residual  losses  between  all  clearing  members;  these  mechanisms  drastically 
reduce negative externalities and absorb market risk (Cecchetti et al., 2009). In this regard, 
we can define CCPs as network infrastructures, where the resiliency of the infrastructure is 
defined by the number and the quality of clearing members. 
  Liquidity resilience. Other positive aspect of the platform is the control of replacement 
costs, as the CCP will access a broad network of participants (CPSS-IOSCO, 2004). A 
smoother  clearing  process,  through  CCP  as  the  only  access  point,  will  enhance  market 
liquidity,  in  particular  for  highly  standardised  products  that  are  eligible  to  be  centrally 
cleared). 
  Economies of scale. CCPs, as network platforms, can achieve significant scale, drastically 
reducing  clearing  services  fees  and,  at  the  same  time,  transaction  costs  for  clearing 
members. 
  Transparency  and  information  asymmetries.  CCPs  implicitly  reduce  information 
asymmetries  that  affect  OTC  derivatives  transactions,  through  strict  requirements  to 
clearing  members  and  clearing  processes.  They  may  also  potentially  be  a  source  of 
transparency for financial markets, especially for regulators, since they store all trade details 
of centrally-cleared transactions; however, CCPs‟ role consist of providing clearing services 
with specific safeguards in order to mitigate systemic risks; their core services may not be 
able  to  offer  qualitative  transparency  services  across  derivative  products  centrally  and 
bilaterally cleared, as a trade repository may actually do, giving an overall aggregate picture 
of the market. 
Therefore, CCPs show a valid system of safeguards through: access restriction for membership 
through capital requirements to participate in the platform; initial and variation margin, and 
collateral requirements in order to mitigate (through homogenisation of) counterparty risk as it 
changes with market conditions; assets segregation, in order to protect collateral from third-
parties‟ claims but also to limit losses for CCPs and their clearing  members;  creation of a 
default fund, composed of resources provided by the financial firm running the platform and by 
clearing  members  as  well;  and  mutualisation  of  losses  through  guarantee  funds  or  back-up 
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However, derivative contracts efficiently cleared through CCPs  may incur risks due to this 
centralised process. Risks and costs of centralised clearing should be carefully evaluated, as 
these network infrastructures may be a source of financial instability once they become „too big 
to fail‟. The following risks have been identified:  
  Switching cost risk. The creation of platforms, such as CCPs, involve high fixed costs and 
initial investments for financial firms that want to create this infrastructure. These high 
fixed costs will make it more expensive and complex for the market to reverse this decision 
in the future; the cost of access and initial requirements to access the CCP may not allow 
clearing members to switch between CCPs, which may in the end fail to reach their critical 
mass of clearing members and transactions, thereby undermining the whole mechanism of 
risk and crisis management performed by a CCP. 
  Cross-border legal risks. Since the OTC derivatives market works globally, the legal risks 
in cross-border transactions increase the number of unconfirmed or incomplete trades and 
the  need  for  globally  harmonised  rules,  such  as  novation  and  close-out  (ESCB-CESR, 
2009). Different legal rules for segregation may involve relevant legal risks in cross-border 
transactions. 
  Concentration and operational risks. The concentration of millions of transactions on a few 
platforms will firstly increase operational risks and replacement cost exposures (Dale, 1998; 
Culp, 2009), as the CCP will have to simultaneously process (verification, confirmation, 
etc.)  thousands  of  trades,  plus  ensuring  that  the  novation  of  contracts  will  not  create 
unforeseen operational risks, as it is main source of unconfirmed trades, especially on cross-
border transactions (the market for OTC derivatives is global). For instance, in cash equity 
markets, CCPs rely on trades being verified and confirmed on the same day in order to be 
included  in  overnight  netting  and  novation  processes;  secondly,  the  concentration  of 
counterparty risks on the same platform will increase the interconnection between clearing 
members, thereby enhancing the „essential‟ aspect of infrastructures; finally, the absence of 
much infrastructure will enhance the importance of market liquidity for the viability of the 
platform and indirectly of the whole market. This situation creates incentives for moral 
hazard,  as  these  institutions  will  be  too  big  and  interconnected  to  fail  (Bliss  & 
Papathanassiou, 2006). 
  Market liquidity risk. CCPs should always ensure that there is enough market liquidity to 
allow the platform to work, for instance, increasing the fungibility of contracts through 
stricter requirements for eligibility, as long as this definition will allow reaching the optimal 
capacity.  
  Interoperability risk. A minimum level of interoperability between CCPs is essential in the 
process  of  centralisation  of  clearing,  as  it  allows  some  competition  in  servicing  costs, 
spreading best practices in risk and crises management, and improving market entry and 
default procedures, through specific arrangements between them. However, interoperability 
involves a double risk: the failure of a CCP may hamper the economic viability of linked 
CCPs  with  disruptive  effects,  and  moral  hazard  may  affect  the  strategies  of  CCPs,  as 
interconnection  will  make  them  too  strong  to  let  them  fail  (CESR  &  ECB,  2009).  In 
addition, information asymmetries may discourage the efficient level of interoperability, as 
a CCP may not have enough information or have enough incentives to provide information 
over eligibility, margin and other safeguards of the linked platform; competition problems 
may also arise as only a few entities will control the entire market, so it is paramount to 
ensure smooth market entry and exit through interoperability. 
  Adverse selection risk. Mechanisms of adverse selection may arise due to the definition of 
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will  not  have  the  incentive  to  disclose  information  that  could  increase  requirements  to 
access the CCP and move on more costly bilateral trading; in this way, CCPs may maintain 
their eligibility requirements at  an excessively high level, forcing good quality users to 
gradually reduce their exposure to OTC derivatives to an inefficient level or make use of 
alternative, probably riskier, products. This mechanism has spiralling effects on the quality 
of users accessing the CCPs, thereby undermining the stability of the market itself. 
  Moral  hazard  risk.  Conversely,  if  the  firm  running  a  CCP  is  not  deeply  involved  in 
providing financial support to the platform, moral hazard risks may arise in the process of 
selection of clearing members and eligible products, as the value of the platform is mainly 
linked to the number of clearing institutions and products eligible to be efficiently cleared. 
  Governance and access risk. Governance of CCPs should be shielded from conflicts of 
interest with clearing institutions as long as regulatory or policy actions do not affect the 
business and the delicate mechanisms of incentives that bring together all clearing members 
on the same platform (see section 8). In addition, non-discriminatory rules should apply for 
access  to  the  platform  (ESCB  &  CESR,  2009)  in  the  upstream  (trading  venues)  and 
downstream (clearing members) side of the market. Access by trading venues to the CCP, 
technological differences, discriminatory cost practices and work flow management can be 
areas for discriminatory practices. 
  Supervisory risk. The supervision of CCPs that are based in different countries and subject 
to different legal systems may imply cross-border risks in supervising and verifying that 
best practices and standards are applied across interlinked and/or isolated CCPs. 
A  minimum  level  of  interoperability  for  transactions  across  CCPs  with  open  and  non-
discriminatory access to these platforms should be a priority, considering the above-mentioned 
risks. 
Nevertheless, as long as the market is liquid and supervision is strong, the long-standing dispute 
over the necessity of one or more CCPs becomes moot because the number of competing CCPs 
is  typically  decided  by  the  market.  In  effect,  when  liquidity  is  low,  the  reduced  netting 
opportunities will increase collateral requirements and exposure to counterparty credit risk with 
more than one CCP (Duffie & Zhu, 2009). Regional CCPs, however, are not indispensable, 
even if regulators opt for strengthening the „essentiality‟ of CCPs in OTC derivatives clearing, 
because  central  banks  should  only  intervene  in  their  currency-denominated  derivative 
transaction, and not on the basis that the CCP, which processes the transaction, is a legal entity 
based in the US rather than Europe. This was clearly done for the banking system during the 
current financial crisis. Thus, it is crucial to ensure access to central banks‟ liquidity, in order to 
keep the market liquid in case of failure of one or more CCPs (Cecchetti et al., 2009).  
In terms of supervision, it is important that these new entities will be supervised with stronger 
international coordination, especially if the main currency traded is that of a country other than 
the one in which the entity is based. In addition, a still rarely discussed problem is the non-
dealer  access  to  the  platform.  Non-dealer  participants  may  participate  in  centrally-cleared 
derivatives transactions that are not at all related to their core business, so they should be only 
partially  involved  in  the  mutualised  mechanisms  of  the  infrastructure.  Therefore,  a  sort  of 
indirect membership may be granted to these non-professional participants, in order to limit 
their stake of the risk (FSA, 2009b). 
In  terms  of  legal  aspects,  centralised  solutions  should  be  supported  by  carefully  drafted 
contracts, in order to avoid constant involvement in costly litigation across several countries 
over legal terms. Legal risks with customised derivatives transactions may hamper the proper 
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the CCP seems sufficient to deal with global markets as it does not sacrifice a party‟s legal right 
to sue another party in case of violations of the law or the contract. However, it raises concerns 
about a potential „race to the bottom‟, which regulators would pursue in order to attract more 
CCPs and so more business. In effect, incentives for regulators to standardise national rules to 
global standards are extremely low. Therefore, a strengthened supranational supervision and 
global mandatory standards for CCPs should at least partially compensate for this potential risk 
of a „race to the bottom‟ between national regulators. 
Finally,  we  can  conclude  that  central  clearing  through  CCPs  is  not  a  better  solution  than 
bilateral clearing in every circumstance. There are pros and cons that should be carefully taken 
into account (such as moral hazard and adverse selection). Central clearing would probably be a 
better solution  for  some  standardised classes  of  products,  with  high  volumes  of  trades  and 
numerous counterparties. Bilateral clearing, instead, will continue and should be allowed  to 
operate  under  the  same  (or  almost  the  same)  requirements  expected  of  CCPs  because,  as 
explained  above,  several  aspects  may  impede  OTC  derivatives  to  clear  on  CCPs  without 
necessarily  increasing  risks  and  inefficiencies.  If  derivatives  contracts  do  not  meet  such 
efficiency conditions or show greater signs of the mentioned risks if cleared on CCPs, there is 
no evidence and economic justification that bilaterally cleared products should be subject to 
stricter requirements than those applied to CCPs. Any attempt to discourage bilateral clearing 
for every OTC derivatives transaction will create serious risks of instability, as well as fewer 
opportunities, in specific cases, to customise risks in the most efficient way. Unquestionably, 
more  should  be  done  in  terms  of  collateral  requirements,  use  of  best  practices  to  reduce 
counterparty risk and better trading and settlement infrastructures, and less on capital charges 
for non-centrally cleared transactions. Any attempt to increase the resilience of OTC derivatives 
markets without a proper assessment of the actual consequences may create instability or affect 
the efficient market functioning in both the short and long run. 
6.6  Other complementary services 
The value chain of OTC derivatives transactions is supported by many complementary services, 
such  as bookkeeping,  accounting  and  regulatory  information  provision  (Hasenpusch,  2009). 
Two services in particular, however, play an important role in propping up the efficiency of a 
derivative‟s value chain and reducing the impact of exposures. 
Firstly, portfolio reconciliation services entail resolution mechanisms to solve disputes over the 
management of collateral and independent amounts (ISDA, 2010b). Failed reconciliations are 
very common in OTC derivatives and they increase costs and time of the transaction, sometimes 
due to trivial mistakes. Therefore, these services match collateral portfolios of counterparties 
and evaluate differences in order to avoid or prevent potential disagreements (ECB, 2009). The 
majority of reconciliation services are provided on a daily basis, while a relevant number of 
trades are reconciled on ad hoc basis or in response to disputes (ISDA Margin Survey 2010 
Preliminary Results, in ISDA, 2010b). 
Secondly, portfolio compression services are widely adopted because they reduce the size of the 
exposure to OTC derivatives. In effect, the portfolio may be inflated by potentially offset trades 
and  redundancies,  which  these  services  can  terminate.  This  compression  may  reduce  the 
collateral and capital requirements burdening the company for the use of OTC derivatives. So 
they can be considered as „Pareto-efficient‟ services, increasing the utility of the transaction for 
both parties without affecting the utility of anyone else. For instance, since January 2008, the 
notional value of CDS positions has decreased from over $60 trillion to below $30 trillion, 
mainly through the widespread use of portfolio compression services. (Duffie et al., 2010).  
Both reconciliation and compression will be even more widely adopted in the coming months, 
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for derivatives transactions. These services are of great support, especially for bilaterally cleared 
transactions. 
Finally, trades, as described above, may be terminated before the maturity date if agreed by 
parties. Therefore, there are specific so-called „termination services‟ that can support the agreed 
terms of earlier termination. 
 
 
Box 2. What is the role of trade repositories? Competition v. centralisation 
A trade repository (or central data repository or swap repository) is an entity that collects data on 
contracts traded in various segments of the OTC derivatives markets, centrally or non-centrally 
cleared. For operational reasons, its introduction in OTC derivatives markets has been pushed 
for, as individually negotiated transactions could be easily tracked after confirmation, especially 
on large books of bilateral contracts. In effect, trade repositories store contracts and all the details 
of the transactions. In this way, for instance, a data repository can facilitate close-out procedures, 
but at the same time it can reduce the negative impact of these procedures for the viability of 
solvent  institutions,  as  exposures  can  be  controlled  in  real  time.  The  qualitative  service 
eventually performed by these entities may also support other less-invasive services performed 
by third parties (such as portfolio compression and reconciliation services).  
Trade repositories are not an alternative to CCPs. However, a trade repository provides some 
services partially replicated by CCPs, such as storing and processing information in order to 
provide an efficient credit event management, a rapid and accurate payment process to calculate 
settlement  amounts  and  multilateral  net  settlement  by  third  parties.  Finally,  this  information 
service makes the bilateral margin processing more efficient. 
There are differences that may justify the creation of a trade data repository, even if ideally CCPs 
were largely diffused in the market. A trade repository collects contracts for all OTC derivatives 
transactions,  especially  if  bilaterally  cleared,  and  provides  a  level  of  granularity  that  is  not 
requested  of  centrally-cleared  products  (in  particular  if  they  adopt  omnibus  accounts).  Since 
bilateral transactions will still be a relevant part of the market and granular information will be 
even more frequently requested, the presence of a trade repository would still be needed. Another 
important reason to use a trade repository, which represents its aim, is the ability to process a 
huge amount of information in order to increase transparency on the real exposures of financial 
and non-financial institutions. Their existence is justified by the provision of services that would 
assure the accuracy of the information. This will indirectly help to bring systemic risk under 
control through an accurate picture of the market, whether or not the derivative transaction is 
centrally cleared. A data repository should be able to produce a reliable picture of a specific 
market and its methods of execution or clearing. For instance, the DTCC trade warehouse, which 
now also provides matching and confirmation services with MarkitSERV (Derv/SERV), gave 
strong support to efforts to assess the real exposure of Lehman Brothers to credit derivatives, as 
over 90% of CDS contracts are stored on this platform. 
In this regard, many observers have expressed doubt over the wisdom of creating more than one 
trade repository. The number of trade repositories should not be a problem, however, as long as 
the market is helped to find its own equilibrium. Most notably, regulators and market participants 
should push forcefully for the standardisation of the format in which data are shared and diffused 
to  trade  repositories  and  to  the  market.  Contracts  details,  which  are  the  product  subject  to 
competition, should be drafted and consequently shared with a single format, in order to make 28 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
 
 
6.7  Settlement and custody 
Settlement services consist of a range of services for cash or physical delivery of a derivatives 
transaction or its underlying asset. They may include termination services to support the early 
settlement of the transaction, such as close-out procedures. The role of settlement services is 
relevant, as they add further risks (not only operational ones) to the value chain if the lapse of 
time between trade execution and settlement is particularly high.
34 It should not be more than 
T+3, following European standards and global recommendations (CPSS &  IOSCO, 2004 and 
ESCB &  CESR,  2009). The amount and type of services strictly depends on   the  type of 
products. Most transactions are preferably settled in central bank money through  specialised 
banks, TARGET2 (for euro -denominated transactions) o r Fedwire (for dollar -denominated 
transactions). Cash or physical assets will be delivered in existing central securities depositories 
(CSDs) (see  ECB, 2009), preferably after being immobilised or dematerialised, in order to 
minimise other relevant risks ( ESCB  &  CESR,  2009). However, credit default swaps and 
foreign exchange derivatives are mainly se ttled through CLS B ank, an entity regulated and 
supervised by the Federal Reserve,
35 while there are still transactions settled through bilateral 
                                                       
34 This risk is called Herstatt risk (or principal risk), from the name of the German bank that in a cross-
border foreign currency transaction in 1974 failed to deliver the agreed amount in USD after it had 
already received the German currency payment, because between the two payments (in the same day) the 
German regulator withdrew its license and the bank blocked its activities and all payments.  
35 For more information on CLS Bank, see http://www.cls-group.com.  
the product as homogeneous as possible and to promote competition between trade repositories 
on  providing  more  qualitative  additional  services  and  thus  transparency.  In  addition,  every 
transaction should be linked to a universal code to be recognised and to avoid double counting 
and misreporting. In effect, there are potential risks that incumbents may try to impose a format 
as a way to segment the market and make it more profitable. This would create serious risks for 
market transparency and indirectly for the entire market for OTC derivatives. It is in the financial 
institution‟s  interest  that  the  quality  of  the  services  provided  by  a  trade  repository  remains 
valuable, as it will use those services to reduce its exposure and collateral as much as possible 
and to make the transaction faster and safer. 
In conclusion, some regulators argued that at least one data repository should be created in every 
region,  in  order  to  avoid  uncontrolled  situations  and  increase  market  transparency.  Both 
motivations are potentially wrong and inconsistent as, even if you have regional repositories, 
there will still be a need for guidelines and requirements to provide access to these services to 
regulators. From a legal point of view, where contracts are physically or electronically located 
does not affect the transaction nor its legal validity. Then, there are no relevant commercial needs 
or cost savings for European institutions with the registration of the transaction in Europe instead 
of the US. Some issues may arise concerning the access that regulators should equally have to 
these warehouses of data. Their creation, therefore, should be allowed as long as these entities 
give financial regulators across the world full access to their registries. For instance, the DTCC 
data warehouse gave full access to regulators and the fact that it is based in the US did not affect 
the process of registration of CDSs that were not executed, cleared or settled on US platforms. In 
effect,  more  than  90%  of  credit  default  swap  transactions  are  stored  in  the  DTCC  data 
warehouse. The risk of imposing the creation of regional facilities or the registration on regional 
facilities may increase transaction costs and reduce the global competition, which have done a lot 
so  far  to  improve  business  models  and  the  portfolio  of  services  around  OTC  derivative 
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netting agreements. Furthermore, clearinghouses and CCPs may also establish arrangements to 
become settlement institutions for centralised trades, as well as providing limited guarantees to 
the trades. 
The last ring of the chain is represented by custody services, which include registration and 
record-keeping of transactions, assets segregation and in specific cases collateral management. 
These services, for cash products, are usually performed by CSDs and custodian banks. This 
phase may be of crucial importance from two points of view: transparency and legal risks. On 
transparency, an accurate recordkeeping of trade details is essential to control risk exposures to 
OTC derivatives. On legal risks, assets segregation is a practice that protects collateral and other 
assets involved in the transactions from creditors‟ claims in bankruptcy procedures, rather than 
other legal claims. Protection through segregation may be efficiently achieved if a customer‟s 
assets are kept safe through apposite accounts (ESCB & CESR, 2009). Improper provision of 
these services may affect the entire transaction and indirectly hamper the viability of involved 
counterparties. 
7.  The OTC derivatives market and the financial crisis 
Although the OTC derivatives market did not trigger the current financial crisis, the worsening 
of the economic outlook and the deterioration of credit exposures
36 have had an impact on 
margins and collateral requirements,  necessitating state intervention for institutions with large 
financial involvement in the derivatives market (e.g. AIG and Lehman Brothers). In effect, 
certain conditions  can potentially undermine the stability of the financial system (network 
externalities). For example, ounterparty risks, pro-cyclical margin requirements (linkage with 
credit ratings) and the opaqueness of financial exposures on the OTC market may spread fear of 
insolvency, drying up liquidity from the markets and triggering disruptive „cascade effects‟ on 
the  whole  system  (FSA,  2009a;  European  Commission,  2009b).  The  collateral  typically 
provided  in  cash  net  value  is  updated  on  a  market-to-market  basis,  while  funding  through 
derivatives involves a flow of pay-offs in the long-term. This mismatch between liabilities and 
assets may accelerate liquidity crises sparking concerns over the real exposure of market players 
and fuelling mechanisms of adverse selection.
37 The opaqueness of the OTC market (especially 
concerning  counterparties‟  exposure)  helps  to  nourish  this  uncertainty.  Therefore,  as  the 
financial conditions worsen, market participants become more risk-averse, cutting exposures 
and leverage, and thereby pushing a further decline in prices and liquidity in the system (on 
endogenous risk, see Danielsson & Shin, 2003). The reduced amount of resources in the system, 
therefore,  tends  to  worsen  credit  risks  and  the  asset  side  of  balance  sheets  (drop  in  asset 
prices),
38  calling for further margins or collateral injections. This unstable situation lowers 
liquidity and feeds the further reduction of resources in the system (Goodhart et al. , 2008; see 
also figure below). The lack of liquidity dramatically affects market efficiency. 
 
 
                                                       
36 We use the common market definition for „exposure‟: the “netted mid-market mark-to-market (MTM) 
value of the transactions in the portfolio between two parties” (ISDA, 2010a, p. 3). 
37 See Akerlof (1970, pp. 488-500). 
38 Protective action on the part of investors to sell their linked assets, in a „herd behaviour‟ manner, can 
become hazardous, spreading negative spillover effects onto other market players (so-called „endogenous 
risk‟); see Danielsson & Shin (2003).  30 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
Figure 7. The effect of the OTC derivatives markets crisis on 
 
Source: Author‟s elaboration. 
In theory, this vicious circle may also accelerate without the impact of huge direct losses in the 
market for derivatives. Trust and confidence in the efficient functioning of financial markets 
play a crucial role. The pro-cyclical aspects of the derivatives market may become a source of 
systemic risk. In this overall context, also non-financial institutions become part of the web of 
mutual dependence (European Commission, 2009d). The main way to stop the vicious circle, 
therefore, is to improve the general economic outlook in the underlying market. For instance, 
AIG is recouping over $3 billion of collateral thanks to the turnaround in the securities market 
and generally in the underlying variable of many derivatives transactions.
39 Whether or not one 
was dealing with regulated or unregulated entities seems finally to have no consequence for the 
final outcome. On the one side,   the lack of transparency is  exacerbated  when derivative 
contracts are sold to unregulated entities (e.g. hedge funds), which make large uncollateralised 
exposures difficult to detect and create uncertainty around hidden exposures (Cecchetti et al. , 
2009). On the other side, with regard to systemic risks, important regulated entities – such as 
AIG –showed less commitment to devote resources such as collateral and to clean up their 
exposures through extensive use of complementary services. 
 
 
                                                       
39 “AIG recoups collateral”, Wall Street Journal, 29 October 2009 (www.wsj.com). SHAPING REFORMS AND BUSINESS MODELS FOR THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET | 31 
Figure 8. Breakdown uncollateralised exposure 
=
Notional Value
Gross Value
Netted Value
Market Value and 
Redundancies
Offsetting contract 
value and cash 
collateral
Exposure
Other safeguards
Uncollateralised
Exposure
-
-
-
=
=
 
Source: Author‟s elaboration. 
In effect, systemic risk in this market is connected to: 
  the value of underlying markets 
  liquidity and 
  counterparty risk.  
First of all, as shown in the figure above, the gross value, which represents a rough measure of 
exposure to these products, tends to increase and approximate the notional value if the fair value 
of these contracts goes down. The financial crisis, in effect, pushed up the gross market value of 
the exposure to all OTC derivative transactions by 58% between June and December 2008, even 
though the notional value went down by 20%. The relative size of the gross amount grew from 
June 2007 to December 2008 by circa 173% to 6% of the notional value. The market value (fair 
value) of underlying assets becomes the first source of systemic risk and it creates a „leverage 
effect‟ on the real exposures as the economic outlook worsens. 
Figure 9. Notional versus gross value 
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Gross over notional value 
 
Source: BIS (2009). 
Secondly,  liquidity  has  a  great  impact  on  OTC  derivatives  contracts,  as  it  helps  to  offset 
customised  contracts  in  order  to  drastically  reduce  the  exposure  before  netting  with  cash 
collateral. An exposure can be a source of systemic risk as long as the customisation is so 
complex (e.g. different maturities or idiosyncratic risks) that the counterparty cannot easily net 
part of its exposures with other held OTC contracts. 
Lastly,  counterparty  risk  can  harm  the  whole  financial  system  if  the  interconnectedness  of 
financial institutions is strong enough to trigger „cascade effects‟ between them. The absence of 
legal certainty around specific safeguards, cash collateral and other risk-reducing agreements, 
then,  may  not  completely  shield  transactions  from  creditors‟  claims  when  one  of  the 
counterparties files for bankruptcy, becomes insolvent or disputes the verification of a credit 
event. In effect, the failure of one institution leads to information asymmetry that freezes the 
market  by  sparking  concerns  about  the  integrity  of  other  financial  institutions.  The  use  of 
services such as netting and collateral management thus may be helpful, since they reduce the 
exposure  of  the  financial  or  non-financial  institution  to  counterparty  risk  and  increase 
transparency  of  the  real  exposure  and  the  interconnection  between  financial  institutions. 
However, as previously mentioned, these services reduce counterparty risk as long as close-out 
agreements are in place (Bliss & Kaufman, 2005). Close-out procedures, as described above, 
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event  has  occurred.  This  event  is  usually  counterparty  insolvency,  but  it  may  also  be  a 
downgrade or debt/firm restructuring. The sudden termination of outstanding contracts should 
be  supported  by  the  legal  framework  in  the  agreed  jurisdiction.  Once  the  legal  support  is 
obtained (which is still lacking in some countries), the outstanding amounts can be netted and 
transactions are terminated. In this way, counterparty risk is drastically mitigated as the net 
debtor or creditor will better manage transactions with lower probability to get into bankruptcy 
procedures, with high risks of procedural delays and amplified knock-on effects. 
8.  Legislative actions in the EU and the US 
The  G-20  commitment
40  to  a  safer financial system pushed g overnments  consider  relevant 
regulatory intervention in the market for OTC derivatives. The aim is to strengthen their safety 
through standardisation and central clearing, as well as  to increase international coordination 
and cooperation. 
The current proposals in  the  EU and  the  US  share  common policy targets: centralisation, 
disclosure and limited access to OTC derivatives. However, the devil is in the details, and in the 
end the regulatory approaches of both parties could substantial ly diverge. Although the main 
features of these reforms have already been set up, the as yet embryonic stage of the European 
proposals does not allow a close comparison with the US approach. 
In the US, three main legislative texts have been circulated in recent months, and the House of 
Representatives has approved a final version, submitting it for approval to the US Senate. In the 
EU, the European Commission drafted two Communications (July and October 2009), but  the 
first legislative proposals will not surface until mid-2010. Regulatory intervention in the US will 
be accomplished through ad hoc regulation, while in the EU the Commission will amend 
existing directives and propose new specific rules. Both regulators, however, aim at ensuring 
financial stability for  OTC derivatives,  as  the  world‟s  largest  financial  market  (European 
Commission, 2009 a,b,c; US Treasury, 2009). 
In order to achieve this ultimate goal of financial stability, the European Commission has set 
four intermediate targets (European Commission, 2009d): 
1.  increasing standardisation, 
2.  promoting the use of organised venues, 
3.  strengthening solutions for mitigating counterparty credit risk through centralised platforms, 
such as CCPs, and 
4.  increasing transparency through a more widespread use of trade repositories. 
In  this  regard,  the  Commission  elaborated  a  set  of  actions,  listed  below,  to  achieve  these 
intermediate targets (see Table 4). 
The US Treasury  plan (US Treasury,  2009) set four relevant objectives,  all of which  were 
preserved in the legislative proposals and final text, except for the last one. These targets were: 
1.  preventing the activities in the OTC derivatives market from posing a risk to the financial 
system, 
2.  promoting efficiency and transparency of that market, 
3.  preventing market manipulation, fraud and other market abuses and 
                                                       
40  See  G-20,  “Declaration  on  strengthening  the  financial  system”,  London  Summit,  2  April  2009 
(http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/PDF/annex-strengthening-fin-sysm). 34 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
4.  ensuring that OTC derivatives are not marketed inappropriately to unsophisticated parties. 
The first two proposals, therefore, envisage a set of measures to achieve greater transparency 
and a more stable and safer market infrastructure, in order to mitigate counterparty risk and to 
encourage a more responsible use of these complex instruments.  
On  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  the  OTC  derivatives  market  seems  to  be  a  source  of  major 
concern for financial stability, while more standardisation, transparency and supervision, and 
stricter requirements are regarded as the means to create a more resilient market infrastructure 
(US  Treasury,  2009,  European  Commission,  2009  a,  e).  European  and  US  regulators  are 
adopting a comprehensive policy approach, moving across asset classes. Interconnections and 
the global nature of this market, however, make a global and coordinated approach between 
Europe  and  the  US  indispensable.  More  should  be  done  to  assess  the  merits  of  the  two 
proposals, as there is a vague idea in circulation that some market solutions (such as CCPs) are 
able to reduce or eliminate counterparty risk. On the contrary, with these market solutions, 
counterparty risk is only redistributed to other market participants. And it is sometimes the case 
that this redistribution assigns counterparty risk to the entity that can not easily bear it.  
As shown in Table 4, we have identified a list of functions in the OTC derivatives market that 
will be subject to regulatory and supervisory interventions: 
1.  Clearing 
2.  Conflicts of interest and governance 
3.  Standardisation 
4.  Trade execution 
5.  Reporting 
6.  Data repositories 
7.  Supervision 
8.  Conduct of business standards 
9.  Other requirements and exemptions. 
As stated above, the EU and the US share a strong commitment to regulating the market, but 
their proposals differ in several important respects. For instance, although EU and US regulators 
converge on the necessity for clearing services to increase the use of centralised solutions (such 
as central counterparty clearinghouses, or CCPs), they actually diverge on the way to implement 
a centralised scenario. However, bilateral clearing will still be possible but with higher capital 
and  margin  requirements.  The  EU  text  does  not  foresee  any  exemption  or  discrimination 
between financial and non-financial companies. 
Clearing 
On the clearing side, OTC derivatives will be gradually pushed towards centralised solutions, 
mainly CCPs, as a result of broader consensus at global level, which had originally formed only 
upon credit derivatives.
41 In effect, the extension of this formal endorsement to all derivatives 
                                                       
41 “We will promote the standardisation and resilience of credit derivatives markets, in particular through 
the establishment of central clearing counterparties subject to effective regulation and supervision”, G-20, 
“Declaration  on  strengthening  the  financial  system”,  London  Summit,  2  April  2009,  p.  3 
(http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/PDF/annex-strengthening-fin-sysm).  Centralisation  of 
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products has been achieved with these two legislative proposals and confirmed at global level 
by the last progress report of the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
42 In the EU, centralisation of 
clearing would push all standardised contracts on CCPs. There is no clarity yet  from publicly 
available documents whether the definition of standardisation will be aligned with the definition 
of  CCP-eligible derivatives. As  mentioned in the conclusion of   Box 1, mandating central 
clearing for all standardised products (which are a wider category than eligible products)  will 
move risks that cannot be adequately managed to a vital „quasi-public‟ network infrastructure 
(see below on standardisation).  
In the US, however, contracts will be centrally cleared by derivatives clearing organisations 
(DCOs),
43 only if both parties are dealers and/or major swap participants (MSPs), and after the 
approval of both  the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission)  and CFTC (Commodities 
Futures Trading Commission). The acceptance by the DCO gives the legal power to impose 
central clearing. In addition, the authorities may also force a DCO to accept a specific derivative 
transaction, as they can take the final action over a dispute. 
It  is  advisable  that  t he  eligibility  of  a  derivative s  product  is  assessed  by  the  clearing 
infrastructure  through  its  risk  committee,  whose  membership  is  independent  from  the 
ownership, in particular if the model of governance is not based on users ownership. Mandatory 
regulatory approval may create unnecessary pressures to include specific products that, in the 
end,  may not be safely centrally -cleared.  Committing to general principles for  the product 
eligibility is not consistent with the customised nature of these transactions and the specific risk 
profile of counterparties. Eligibility assessment should be done on a case-by-case basis and 
regulatory authorities should only verify that  the procedures applied by the infrastructure are 
transparent and non-discriminatory. 
Conflicts of interest and governance 
Potential conflicts of interest in the clearing approval procedure between financial institutions 
and DCOs pushed the US authorities to insert an article in the legislative text that limits the 
stake of frequent swap users (so-called „restricted owners‟) in the ownership of DCOs below 
20%  (Lynch  amendment).  In  effect,  the  risk  of  conflicts  of  interest  in  the  governance  of 
financial infrastructure (such as a CCP) is a source of concern.
44 The Lynch amendment was 
removed from the bill‟s text, following the proposal at Senator Dodd in March 2010.
45 In any 
case, a rule limiting the stake of ownership in the infrastructure will not solve or mitigate the 
concern, as the potentiality to acquire the full control over the infrastructure will still be in the 
hands of two or  a few financial institutions. As explained  above (section 6.5), a CCP is a  
network infrastructure whose value comes from the quality of its members and less from the 
resilience of the company running the infrastructure. As long as  regulation works to preserve 
this value, it should be seen as efficient. This  amendment, which is circulating in Europe as 
                                                                                                                                                             
institutions at international level, even before the G-20 summit; for instance, see CRMPG III (2008, p. 
125), FSB (2008, p. 6) and G-30 (2009, p. 53).  
42 FSB (2009, p. 10). 
43 DCOs and CCPs are two different categories of entities performing clearing services. For  the sake of 
simplicity, in the text hereinafter, we will use the terms „DCO‟ and „CCP‟ interchangeably, even though 
there are differences between them. 
44 On the governance of financial infrastructure, see Lee (2010). 
45 See Dodd‟s draft in footnote 48. 36 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
well,
46  is not consistent with the economics of a CCP and it will not miti gate conflicts of 
interest. On the contrary, it may hamper market initiatives towards  an efficient model for the 
governance of network infrastructures,  i.e.  the  user-ownership  model.  In  effect,  a  few  big 
clearing members may acquire a sufficient stake in the infrastructure to extract as much benefits 
as possible from smaller clearing members, which will have little latitude to move on to another 
infrastructure, as they will suffer high switching costs
47 (direct and indirect). Once it is decided 
to mandate specific products to centralised infrastructures, clearing members must be allowed to 
participate in the governance of the infrastructure. Their resources feed the default funds, which 
allow CCPs to operate in complex derivatives markets with enough capital. Whether or not this 
governance should give control to the members through per capita voting or on the basis of the 
resources  invested  in  the infrastructure (e.g.  default funds), this should be chosen  by the 
infrastructure itself. In theory, a model of ownership that assigns more voting rights to financial 
institutions that commit more resources to the infrastructure may  be the best interpretation of 
the trade-off between control and resilience of the network infrastructure. In effect,  on the one 
hand, the  more resources clearing members are willing to commit , the more  resilient is the 
infrastructure and the more open is ownership (user-oriented). On the other hand, the more the 
financial institution wants to keep control of the infrastructure, the more this choice will cost, 
also in terms of indirect costs as  there is a risk that less clearing members would be willing to 
commit resources in an infrastructure controlled by one or few institutions.  Finally, once the 
model of ownership is defined, the risk committee should focus its attention on these platforms, 
which should be independent from the owners;, at the same time,  however, owners should be 
able to express their views in the governance of the infrastructure. A user-owned infrastructure 
cannot be mandated, as it  would mean the mutualisation of these infrastructures. However, 
clearing members should be aware of the benefits of a user-ownership model, which may in the 
long term offset the initial investment to acquire a mutual control.  
Standardisation 
With regard to standardisation, the US proposal does not define when a product should be 
considered „standardised‟. Then, the section stating that regulators should presume a product is 
“standardised” if cleared by the DCO has been removed from the final text.
48 This would have 
                                                       
46  See  Werner  Langen‟s  report  for  the  Committee  on  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs  of  the  EU 
Parliament 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/draftReportsCom.do?language=EN&body=ECON). 
47 Several costs may obstacle switching infrastructure. The main ones are tran saction costs (costs of 
bridging the new platform to the clearing member), “exit” costs, opportunity costs, and uncertainty costs. 
48  This  definition  also  differed  from  Congressman  Barney  Frank‟s  discussion  draft  bill  on  OTC 
derivatives,  where  „standardised‟  derivatives  could  be  also  non-centrally  cleared,  even  though  DCOs 
would be required to accept standardised products regardless of where the derivative is executed. See 
Barney  Frank,  To  enact  the  Over-The-Counter  Derivatives  Markets  Act  of  2009,  Discussion  draft 
introduced to the House of Representative, 13 October 2009; hereinafter, “Frank‟s Discussion Draft” (see 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs_dem/discussion_draft_otc.pdf). As indicated in Table 
5, we will also refer to another discussion draft, hereinafter “Dodd‟s Discussion Draft”, from Christopher 
Dodd, Chairman of the US Senate Banking Committee, introduced to the House on 1 November 2009 
(see  http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/AYO09D44_xml.pdf).  There  is  also  a  third  proposal 
submitted  by  Rep.  Peterson,  House  Agriculture  Committee;  see 
http://agriculture.house.gov/inside/Legislation/111/JDG_372_xml.pdf. Finally, there is the text approved 
by the House of Representative on December 11th, hereinafter the “2009 Act”, H.R. 4173, The Wall 
Street  Reform  and  Consumer  Protection  Act  of  2009,    US  House  of  Representatives  (see 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.4173).On  15  March  2010,  Senator  Christopher  Dodd 
proposed a new bill for financial reform with a new text for the OTC derivatives legislation. Few relevant 
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implied the same definition of standardisation and eligibility, which in reality are two different 
concepts (see Box 1). The proposal, in effect, asks the SEC and the CFTC to build a more 
detailed definition of „standardised product‟, as not all standardised products are eligible to be 
cleared on CCPs, even though regulators can put pressure on CCPs to extend their definition of 
„eligible product‟.  
In the EU, there is no definition of standardised products, which may also actually fall outside 
the control of the CCPs. The Commission will emphasise the role of incentives to invest in 
standardisation,  standard  contracts  and  procedures.  In  addition,  as  explicitly  stated  in  its 
Communication,  the  Commission  will  put  pressure  on  CCPs  to  align  standardisation  with 
eligibility,  which  may  create  unexpected  risks.  Pressuring  CCPs  to  include  as  many 
standardised  transactions  as  possible  may  pose  a  potential  risk  of  including  derivatives 
transactions on the CCP network that may not be suitable for central clearing or backed by 
institutions that are not sufficiently committed to the resiliency of the infrastructure. In effect, 
forcing the system to clear specific derivative transactions that, in a normal regime, would not 
have been accepted may weaken the whole network, as central clearing network infrastructures 
(such as CCPs) are based on mutual respect by market participants of all general requirements. 
The compliance with uniform and accepted requirements by all clearing members indirectly 
pushes clearing members to accept the mutualisation of losses, which represent the support of 
last  resort  for  the  whole  platform.  It  is  therefore  important  to  keep  the  quality  of  clearing 
members and cleared transactions very high. Undue pressure on OTC derivatives products to 
become  standardised,  then,  may  concretely  affect  the  ability  of  these  products  to  satisfy 
customised risk needs. As explained above, investments and pressure should be focused on 
introducing and diffusing electronic and automated mechanisms in the post-trading area. For 
instance, the objective to reduce the duration of the whole cycle, with settlement, to an ideal 
T+1 – at the latest – should be pursued. 
Adverse selection
49 may affect the system, as good clearing members will see increasing cost s 
of clearing  (due to reduced  freedom for CCPs to define strict eligibility requirements for 
products and members) despite their unchanged compliance with the CCP requirements. These 
circumstances will gradually induce part of these clearing members to exit the platform or to 
substantially reduce their positions or to make regulatory arbitrage with other jurisdictions (the 
market for OTC derivatives is global in nature), since their risk is not correctly priced.  
                                                                                                                                                             
legislation  available  at  http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Issues.View&Issue_id= 
630c2b4a-ef2a-9ff3-5e79-bbe3c26422da).  
49 In Akerlof (1970), in effect, the classical example to explain this informational problem is the market 
for lemon cars. The adverse selection, in effect, arises when products of different quality (e.g. lemons and 
good cars; junk and good bonds and so on) are sold at a single price because  of asymmetric information 
(inability of the buyer or lender to understand the real quality/risk of the cars/financial product or 
borrower), so that too much of the low-quality product and too little of the high-quality product are sold. 
In the market for lemons and good cars, for instance, the equilibrium will result in a market price (due to 
the inability of the buyer to understand  ex ante the quality of the product) a bit higher than lemons‟ real 
value and consistently lower than good cars‟ real value. Hence, the market equilibrium, in the mid-term, 
will determine that only lemons are sold in the market. This important issue may basically freeze markets 
justifying  mechanisms  for  signalling  quality,  such  as  neutral  third-party  informational  tools  (rating 
agencies, etc.), regulatory interventions or simply pre-sale services. See Pyndick & Rubinfeld (2004, p. 
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Moral hazard,
50 in addition, may induce some  clearing members  – whose acceptance by the 
CCP is mandated or pressured by regulation – to exploit this situation by making little effort to 
fully comply with the CCP requirements, as they feel somehow protected by the network or 
they just freely ride on other members‟ stronger commitment. Therefore, it should be clearly 
stated that mutualisation of losses should intervene only when the involved clearing members 
have put all their available resources into the transaction, even though it might be not enough. In 
a centralised scenario for clearing services, the platform itself may become „too big to fail‟, also 
increasing moral hazard of the entities assigned to manage the infrastructure and provide the 
related services. In this case, the intervention of the central bank should be limited to specific 
situations, such as when the entity that is supposed to manage the infrastructure has already 
used all its own resources to save the network. However, this solution would not be adequate if 
the clearing member is structurally not able to comply with the regular requirements set by the 
CCP for joining the network, but acceptance of the infrastructure had become compulsory by 
law. Nor would it solve the potential problem of adverse selection, as described above. Stress 
tests must be periodically performed in order to verify that members and the infrastructure 
maintain the same efforts over time. 
Furthermore, if the service provided by CCPs is recognised as a public good,
51 with the risk of 
free-riding (moral hazard),  some  authors argue  that a public -private partnership could be 
promoted to control the ownership and the governance of this infrastructure on  the one hand, 
and enforce policies to face diverging incentives between members and the infrastructure and 
control systemic risks on the other hand (Rausser et al., 2009). 
Trade execution 
Turning  to  trade  execution,  both  US  and  EU  proposals  push  for  centralised  execution  of 
derivatives  trades.  US  legislation  follows  the  general  principle  that  every  centrally  cleared 
derivative  transaction  should  move  on  a  board  of  trade  (exchange  or  alternative  trading 
platform). The law also foresees that both counterparties should be swap dealers and/or major 
swap participants. Therefore, an occasional swap user, with no regular business or substantial 
net position or exposure, can trade over-the-counter on a bilateral basis and clear the transaction 
outside a DCO. In the EU, the Commission expressed a „societal preference‟ for transparent 
trading  venues  and  with  strengthened  risk  management  procedures  (European  Commission, 
2009a, b & c). All standardised derivatives should move on organised trading venues, as defined 
by MiFID
52 (regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities and systematic internalisers).  
Reporting and data repositories 
Transparency  plays  a  pivotal  role  in  the  forthcoming  legislation.  Most  notably,  a  more 
transparent environment may bring the evolution of systemic risks under control, but it may also 
induce  market  participants  to  pursue  more  accurate  internal  due  diligence  and  increase  the 
                                                       
50 Moral hazard is an informational problem related to the opportunistic behaviour of the more informed 
party, who tries to exploit the informational advantage and the scarce ability of the less informed party to 
monitor the other‟s activity. See Holmstrom (1979) and Milgrom & Roberts (1992). 
51 DCOs (e.g. CCPs) are gradually becoming public infrastructure, as they are progressivel y providing 
non-exclusive services for market participants. The absence of competition, however, may be affected by 
mandating the use of the platform, increasing risk concentration on  a few entities and creating inefficient 
distortive incentives. Trading markets, currently compete exclusively for profit. 
52 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, EC Directive n. 2004/39 and implementing Directive (n. 
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quality  of  risk  management,  which  will  not  only  be  based  on  external  resources,  as  has 
frequently been the case in the past.  
In  the  US  legislative  proposal,  recordkeeping  and  reporting  requirements  are  stricter  than 
previously (including audit trails and daily reporting). DCOs, data repository and authorities 
should publicly disclose aggregate positions, while private information can only be delivered to 
authorities on a confidential basis. Information on single transactions (and reference entities) is 
not relevant for public disclosure. This two-tier system helps to increase transparency without 
seriously  affecting  businesses.  In  effect,  “if  transparency  requires  trading  [and  business] 
strategies to be made public, so that their price impact becomes large [enough], then the survival 
of the market will be jeopardised” (Acharya & Richardson, 2009). These authors have also 
argued  (referring  to  the  CDS  market)  that  information  on  price,  contract  and  counterparty 
exposures should be immediately available for authorities, while some of this information can 
be disclosed to the public only on a delayed basis.  
The  US  text,  in  addition,  mandates  the  use  of  data  repositories  only  for  bilaterally-cleared 
transactions. DCOs, in this way, have the further responsibility to provide reporting services 
with the same standards  as data repositories.  In the EU, the Commission focused more on 
transparency of price and positions and there is no clear statement whether a single position 
should  or  should  not  be  publicly  disclosed.  The  proposal  could  extend  the  reporting 
requirements set by Art. 25(3) MiFID to all OTC transactions. Both proposals mandate data 
repositories,  but  the  US  proposal  mandates  data  repositories  only  for  non-centrally  cleared 
transactions, whereas the EU Communication states that data repositories should be used for all 
OTC derivatives transactions. The European Commission will also set stricter requirements to 
receive the authorisation in Europe as data repository. The supervision will be done by the new 
European  Securities  and  Markets  Authority  (ESMA),  formerly  the  Committee  of  European 
Securities  Regulators  (CESR).  There  is  no  limitation  on  the  number  of  data  repositories 
operating on OTC derivatives markets. Competition between multiple data repositories does not 
seem to be a source of concern on either side of the Atlantic, even though the US will probably 
converge on the DTCC model.  
Supervision 
On supervision, the US proposal promotes the supervision of securities-based swaps by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the remaining derivatives by the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC). The Federal Reserve (FED) will receive information from these 
two primary regulators and will enforce margin and capital requirements for banks, as defined 
by  section  4(s)e.  Authorities  may  establish  position limits,  ban  „abusive  swaps‟  or  prohibit 
access to the US financial system for specific institutions, in order to preserve the public interest 
and to protect investors. In Europe, it is not yet clear how supervision will be split between the 
new authorities.
53 It would be problematic for the European Central Bank (ECB)  to supervise 
CCPs, as the powers given by the Statute are limited. The European Systemic Risk Board will 
supervise systemic risks that the derivatives market  poses for global financial systems.  The 
powers  that  this  authority  will  exercise   in  the  context  are  not  yet  clear.  The  October 
Communication, then, reaffirms the importance of international cooperation at G -20 level to 
promote the convergence of regulatory standards. 
 
                                                       
53  For  more  information  about  the  new  supervisory  system,  please  check 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/committees/index_en.htm.  40 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
Conduct of business 
On conduct of business standards, the European Commission has not yet taken a clear position, 
but the proposed extension of MiFID to the OTC market may provide a solid background of 
business conduct standards to apply to this area of financial markets. However, the derivatives 
market  is  different  from  the  cash  equity  market  in  the  nature  of  participants,  products, 
investment targets, etc. Transparency requirements, instead, may share the same objectives in 
the two markets (e.g. better disclosure). MiFID requirements for the access to the infrastructure 
may be extended for the use of CCPs. In the US, instead, the legislative proposal foresees that 
the authorities will set general principles on disclosure, market manipulation and standard of 
care. To solve conflicts of interest, the House also approved an amendment that prohibits swaps 
users from holding a stake of more than 20% in a DCO, board of trade or alternative trading 
platform. This rule has a more general meaning, as it opens the discussion over the governance 
of financial infrastructure in a global market that is currently converging to concentrate risks on 
centralised solutions (consistently regulated and supervised). 
8.1  Other requirements and exemptions 
As  indicated  in  the  table  on  the  following  page,  the  two  proposals  list  several  other 
requirements, such as margin and capital requirements for bilateral transactions. In effect, the 
US regulator will increase capital and initial margin requirements for swap dealers and major 
swap participants (hereinafter MSPs) that do not use centrally cleared (customised) derivatives 
or with large exposures. A prudential regulator may, however, extend these requirements to 
non-swap  dealers  or  MSPs.  It  is  economically  justifiable  that  for  customised  and  bilateral 
transactions, more margin requirements may be required as the transaction could be riskier, due 
to a mutual mechanism of safeguards set up by the platform and the absence of a network able 
to  provide  more  liquidity  to  the  transaction.  Then,  the  transaction  itself  –  due  to  high 
customisation – could affect liquidity as it will not be easy to resell in the secondary market. 
Capital requirements, instead, may not meet justified concerns. Capital requirements are usually 
imposed  on  financial  institutions  whose  core  business  is  the  exchange  of  financial  flows. 
However, requesting non-financial companies to increase their capital requirements – especially 
in relation to transactions used for hedging purposes – can be costly and inefficient. In effect, 
capital charges help to discourage the use but they do not concretely increase the safety of the 
transaction (capital is subject to other creditors‟ claims, etc.). For this reason, the US proposal 
actually  adds  an  exception  (not  present  in  the  EU  proposal)  stating  that  positions  held  for 
hedging purposes should not be included in the definition of major swap participant. While one 
may question the potential wide impact of this exemption, the US regulator is clearly trying to 
find a solution to the effect that capital requirements may have on specific non-financial and 
global businesses. 
In the EU proposal, there is a generic statement aiming to impose capital requirements and 
higher margins on companies without discriminating their final use. The proposal also asks for 
higher  variation  margins,  which  are  usually  set  by  participants  once  critical  aspects  of  the 
transaction should suddenly change (they have a cyclical nature). It would be preferable to leave 
this decision to the market, in order to avoid unjustifiable interferences with their daily business. 
There is also the risk to increase the dependence of non-financial companies from the financial 
system, as they will need new lines of credit to satisfy stricter margin requirements (FSA, 
2009b) or they may outsource the collateral management to a third party agent or directly to a 
custodian (ISDA, 2010b). In effect, the Communication then introduces an exemption from 
stricter  variation  margins  for  non-financial institutions  whose  use  of  derivatives  is  below a 
„given  threshold‟.  However,  setting  a  threshold  may  dramatically  split  the  market  and  also 
influence business models in case the level is too high or too low. These decisions should be 
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often fully compensated for by the revenues of the core business if the trend is going in the 
opposite direction of the hedged variable. Therefore, without a proportionate approach, hedgers 
will be more exposed to their risk profile than in the other scenarios, and perhaps they will be 
led towards alternative solutions that are not completely tailored around their risk management 
strategies. 
Both sets of proposals call for increased market surveillance: in the US, through the above-
mentioned authorities and in Europe through the extension of the Market Abuse Directive to 
OTC derivatives (in particular to alternative trading platforms).  
Concerning the problem of account segregation mentioned above, the swap counterparty, in US 
legislation, may ask the dealer to segregate the assets (margins and collateral) into a third-party 
custodian account or it should provide quarterly updates about its back-office procedures for 
collateral and margins. To be a „third-party‟, the dealer or MSP should not hold more than 20% 
of ownership or 50% of representation on the Board of the custodian that segregates the assets. 
Finally, the US text sets a list of exemptions. First of all, a list of „identified banking products‟ 
is exempted from this regulation, as they may already be under stricter or different regulation 
and  requirements.  Secondly,  as  mentioned  above,  positions  held  for  hedging  or  risk 
management purposes should be excluded from this regulation. In this regard, regulators should 
set clear definitions of hedging and risk management purposes, as this rule may be used to 
circumvent the entire regulation. A residual exemption is granted to derivatives not accepted by 
the DCO (Derivatives Clearing Organisation) and/or approved by the authorities, as well as in 
the case when one party is not a swap dealer of an MSP. 
To sum up, US and EU interventions appear to be following the same regulatory path, but in the 
end show striking divergences. Although motivated by a shared commitment, details in the 
current texts differ in the several important respects. EU and US market participants, on the 
other hand, call for a more proportionate approach and uniform reaction on a global level. In 
effect,  before  the  crisis,  financial  institutions  were  already  starting  to  channel  derivatives 
transactions into CCPs. The US – seemingly more prescriptive with rules such as the one on 
conflicts  of  interest,  which  limits  the  ownership  stake  of  financial  institutions  in  the 
infrastructure – is adopting a legislative text that allows wide exemptions (as described in the 
table above). In Europe, conversely, there is still uncertainty about the final regulatory actions, 
but  an  approach  that  does  not  discriminate  between  market  participants  and  products  –  as 
current proposals fail to do – may have devastating effects in comparison to the US legislative 
text. Nevertheless, MiFID and the capital requirements Directive (CRD), in particular, may be a 
valuable reference point from which to draft new regulations for OTC derivatives in Europe. 
Finally, the risk of patchwork regulation across the world‟s largest financial market is around 
the corner. It may create regulatory arbitrage and result in an inefficient final equilibrium. 
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Table 5. US and EU OTC derivatives proposals: A comparison of key features  
  Financial Stability 
  US  EU 
Clearing 
  All „standardised‟ OTC derivatives are required by law to be cleared through regulated derivatives 
clearing organisations (DCOs)**. 
  A swap shall be centrally cleared if accepted by a DCO and if both parties are dealers or major 
swap participant (MSP).  
  CFTC and SEC should approve which classes of derivatives will be centrally cleared, taking into 
account different aspects (significant outstanding notional, availability of clearinghouses, etc; 
§113, (a) (2) '(j)' (1)). DCOs are obliged to submit all swaps that are seeking to accept for clearing. 
  DCOs should accept standardised products and considered centrally-cleared products with same 
terms fungible to be offset if accepted by the CFTC and SEC 
  Pressure to bring standardised OTC derivatives on CCPs (e.g. CDSs from 30 July 
on CCPs ). This provision should mandate standardised products on CCPs, but the 
Commission needs to define which contract can be regarded as standardised (p. 6). 
  Bilateral clearing is allowed but with more requirements - (COM '09a, p. 9).   
  Ad hoc legislation for central counterparty clearing (CCPs)  concerning: conduct 
of business and governance (Conflict of interests, access, transparency, etc), risk 
management standards, authorisation [EU passport], recognition of third-country 
CCPs, and legal protection to collateral and positions (COM '09d, p. 4). 
Standardisation 
  The term „standardisation‟ will be defined by SEC and CFTC.  
  Presumption of standardisation if accepted by a DCO. 
  Setting standards for customized trades and power for regulators to prohibit not standardised 
products. 
  More standardisation also for non-CCP eligible OTC derivatives; 
  Standardisation to achieve through: incentives to invest in standardisation; standard 
contracts (also on bilateral basis) - (COM '09a, p. 9-10; '09b, p. 3). Plus 
standardisation of legal regimes (COM '09d, p. 10). 
Trade execution 
  Only Eligible Contract Participants (ECPs) can trade derivatives over-the-counter (entering in a 
contract). 
  Trading of derivatives must move on a board of trade if they are centrally cleared and both 
counterparties are swap dealers and/or MSPs. 
  Societal preference for transparent and competitive trading venues (as exchanges), 
namely where trade-related information is publicly disclosed and risk management 
is consistently strengthened - (COM '09a, p. 12). 
  All standardised derivatives should be traded on organised trading venues (as 
defined by MiFID, excluding Crossing Networks), where appropriate (COM '09d, p. 
8). 
Reporting 
  CFTC and SEC will impose record-keeping and reporting requirements (including an audit trail 
and daily trading records) on all OTC derivatives. 
  DCOs, data repositories and CFTC (under Section 4r) should promptly disseminate reporting 
(aggregate data) on trades, prices and other information on a confidential basis to primary 
regulators (CFTC, SEC)  - (OTC Act '09 §715, UST '09, p.48). 
  In transactions where counterparties are or dealers or MSPs, both shall report the transaction. If 1 
only is dealer or MSP, this part shall report the transaction. If neither parties are dealers or MSPs, 
only 1 party should be required to report the transaction to trade repositories or the Commission, if 
not centrally cleared. 
  Increasing market transparency on: positions (complete only on single institutions 
and case-by-case); prices (available to market participants via inter-dealer brokers; 
also post-trade information). 
  Improving information reporting (extending art. 25(3) MiFID to derivatives with 
underlying based on financial instruments listed on exchanges or to all OTC 
transactions) - (COM '09b, p. 9-11). 
Data Repository 
  A regulated trade repository must be used for derivatives not cleared on DCOs. Both 
counterparties should report to it. 
  More than one repository is implicitly allowed, while they will be requested to register and 
comply with specific duties. 
  Use of data repositories should be mandated for all transactions (if not traded on 
exchanges or centrally cleared) to increase transparency (on prices, transactions 
and positions) and reduce operational risks (p. 7) 
  Regulated on the operative side, covering authorisation/registration, access and 
participation to the repository, data quality and timeliness, access to data, 
safeguarding of data, legal certainty of registered contracts, governance and 
operational reliability. This control should be done by CESR/ESMA. Authorisation 
should be also requested for third-country repositories in the EU on the principle of 
"equivalence" (COM '09d, p. 7-8). 
Supervision 
  CFTC and SEC will be primary regulators, working to harmonize futures and securities regulation 
on swaps, to police market, and to limit access for unsophisticated counterparties. 
  SEC to supervise security-based swaps, CFTC to supervise the rest. Disputes to be solved by the 
Financial Services Oversight Council.  
  No final statements on supervision; decision has been referred to ad hoc legislative 
proposals (after the De Larosiere report), which are going to shape also the 
supervisory aspects of derivatives markets. 
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  FED will be secondary „prudential regulator‟, getting information from primary regulators; it 
oversights market infrastructure, and has to enforce the provisions on capital and margins in 
section 4(s)e. 
  CFTC may establish position limits and other restrictions for the public interest in order to face 
„excessive speculation‟. 
  SEC and CFTC can ban „abusive swaps‟ and the „access to the United States financial system‟ for 
entity domiciled in a specific country; they can impose position limits or accountability for public 
interest and protection of investors. 
  The European Systemic Risk Board will supervise the systemic risks that 
derivatives markets pose to the whole financial system - (COM '09a, p.8). 
  More international cooperation at G-20 level, in order to avoid regulatory 
arbitrages and lead to the convergence on regulatory standards (COM '09d, p. 3) 
Business Conduct 
Standards 
  General business conduct standards and requirements on disclosure, market manipulation and duty 
of care prescribed by the Commission.  None 
Other Require-
ments 
  Customised OTC derivatives should not be used to avoid using a DCO (severe controls on it). 
  Swap dealers and MSPs using customised OTC derivatives (not accepted by DCOs) or with large 
exposures will comply with higher capital charges, dual registration, business conduct standards, 
prudential supervision and initial margin requirements. Prudential regulator and Commissions for 
bank swap dealers or MSPs and non-bank will set capital charges more than zero for centrally-
cleared derivatives and higher for non centrally-cleared derivatives. Initial and variation margins 
also should be imposed to them for non centrally-cleared transactions. (H.R. 4173 §117, '§4s' (e)). 
  Obligation of registration for DCOs, plus other duties (compliance officer, reporting, etc). 
  Marketing to unsophisticated investors shall be regulated. 
  At the request of a swap counterparty, the swap dealer shall segregate the assets as margin or 
collateral into a „third-party‟ custodian, or should report to its counterparty on a quarterly basis 
about its back office procedures for margins and collateral. 
  If a dealer or MSP owns more than 20% (or more than 50% representation in the board of 
directors) of a custodian, the custodian should not be considered independent for the purpose of 
assets segregation (Lynch Amendment).   
  CFTC and SEC to define „substantial net position‟ and „substantial net counterparty exposure‟ in 
the definition of MSP. 
  Avoiding regulatory arbitrages. 
  Extension of Art. 25(3) MiFID also to financial instruments non admitted to trading 
on regulated markets (COM '09, p. 10). 
  Improving operational efficiency for non-CCP eligible derivatives through: 
electronic affirmation and confirmation service; central storage of contract details; 
automation of payments and collateral management processes. Improving use of 
electronic processing (p. 10).  
  Non-CCP eligible products should be subjected to higher capital charges? - (COM 
'09a, p. 9) Yes, more capital charges for bilaterally-cleared contracts by 
modification of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD; p. 6). 
  More collateral through initial and variation margins (amending the CRD). 
Exemption to use variation margins for non-financial institutions whose use of 
derivatives is below a "given threshold" (p. 5).  
  More pre-trade and post-trade transparency should be carefully taken into account, 
also for OTC products. Transparency requirements will be probably introduced for 
all derivatives with the forthcoming MiFID review in 2010 (p. 8). 
  Review of exemptions for commodity firms from MiFID ( p. 11). 
  Extending MAD to OTC derivatives (p. 11). 
  Giving regulators the power to set position limits (COM '09d, p. 11). 
Other exemptions 
  No further capital charges or margin requirements if one of the two parties is not a dealer or MSP. 
However, the prudential regulator may extend margin requirements also to swaps not cleared by 
DCOs and to non swap dealers or MSPs; §117, §154). 
  "Identified banking products" are exempted from this regulation (§113 (c) (2)). 
  The group of major swap participants should exclude positions held for hedging commercial risks 
or risk management purposes. 
  A swap may be exempted by central clearing on DCOs and trading on a Board of Trade if no DCO 
accepts it or if one counterparty is not a swap dealer or MSP, or does not meet eligibility 
requirements of a DCO. 
None 
*Underlined text is NOT included in the text approved by the US House of Representatives (H.R. 4173) and under discussion in the US Senate, which represents the most relevant measures proposed in the 
"Discussion Drafts" by Frank and Dodd, plus other legislative and non legislative texts. OTC Act '09 is the text introduced to the House on October 2nd. 
** We will indifferently refer in the text to clearing agencies and derivatives clearing organisations as DCOs or CCPs. 
*** In italics relevant measures proposed by the new Commission Communication on October 2009 (EU COM '09d). 
Source: Author‟s own compilation based on Dodd‟s Senate Bill 2010, H.R. 4173 Act „09, October OTC Act ‟09, Discussion Drafts ‟09, COM „09a-b-c-d, UST ‟09.44 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
 
Box 3. The Volcker rule: A big cloud over OTC derivatives markets 
The financial crisis called into question the stability and safety of the financial system. Several 
reforms for the banking system are under discussion at G-20 level, a few of which have been 
endorsed or are currently being evaluated by relevant national governments (JP Morgan, 2010): 
1.  Volcker rule for US banks (Volcker, 2010) 
2.  Separation of activities (narrow banking) 
3.  Basel III proposals 
4.  Solvency II proposals in the European Union 
5.  Increased liquidity and leverage requirements 
6.  Proposals for dynamic provisioning 
7.  Proposal for new taxes (such as the liability tax and the Tobin tax) 
Any one of these proposed reforms would have an impact on the market for OTC derivatives, but 
the greatest long-term structural impact can be expected from the Volcker rule, proposed by the 
former Chairman of the Federal Reserve (1979-87) and currently Chairman of the Economic 
Recovery Advisory Board created by the Obama administration. This proposal aims at restricting 
the engagement in proprietary trading and the ownership or sponsorship of hedge funds and/or 
private equity funds for FDIC depository institutions, in order to prevent non-bank financial 
institutions from free-riding public guarantees and support. 
As shown in the table below, the measure will have a major impact on investment banks, which 
will see 10% of their investment revenues (as pure proprietary trading) almost disappear (-85%, 
which is the estimation made by JP Morgan). Following Volcker‟s proposal, financial institutions 
will never regain this profitable business unless they  are willing  to run it  in a separate and 
distinct entity. 
The impact of Volcker rule on global banks 
 
It is not possible to quantify the impact of the Volcker rule on OTC derivatives markets but the 
proposal is currently limited to proprietary trading activities. Dealer-broker activities should only 
indirectly be affected by this proposal (through a potential lower level of bank activities on 
proprietary  trading).  The  financial  infrastructure  of  OTC  derivatives  markets  should  remain 
intact even if the US government adopts the Volcker rule, the full impact of which can only be 
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9.  Prospects for the OTC derivatives market: Four scenarios 
As a result of the proposed regulatory interventions, the market for OTC derivatives may evolve 
towards one of four possible scenarios (or a combination there of), diagrammed in Figure 10: 
  Pure OTC derivatives 
  Centrally-cleared OTC derivatives 
  Disclosed and highly collateralised bilateral transactions 
  Exchange-traded derivatives. 
These scenarios are designed around the role of regulation and central clearing to pursue a 
specific outcome. In effect, regulatory actions and the move on central clearing may involve 
stark trade-offs, such as liquidity vs. disclosure and customisation vs. standardisation. In effect, 
liquidity – the most important characteristic of the OTC derivatives market – may be affected by 
excessive disclosure on single positions since it is primarily professional investors who deal 
with this market.
54 Derivatives transactions that can reveal business strategies may be pushed 
out of the market. Reducing counterparty risk through massive standardisation and increasing 
transparency through excessive disclosure may a ffect respectively customisation and  market 
liquidity. These  scenarios  are not  mutually  exclusive,  but they  can cohabit  in  the  OTC 
derivatives market.  
Figure 10. OTC derivatives matrix 
 
Source: Author‟s elaboration. 
9.1  Scenario A 
The first scenario is the current one, i.e. before any regulatory intervention has taken place. 
OTC derivatives are mainly traded and cleared on a bilateral basis and transactions are highly 
customised (even bespoke), in order to meet specific risk profiles or investment decisions. This 
                                                       
54 In markets where retail investors are largely involved, however, the outcome may be the opposite; for 
instance the bond market is a good example how the shift from both retail and professional markets to an 
OTC-professional market has affected the liquidity of the market itself (see Biais & Green, 2007). 46 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
flexibility does not restrain the possibility to trade vanilla and highly standardised products, 
which actually represent more than 2/3 of the market (Nystedt, 2004). Disclosure is mainly self-
regulated (unless derivatives are backed by securities regulated in the underlying market) and 
limited to market initiatives (such as the DTCC model), that publish only some aggregate data. 
There is little chance that this scenario will survive the coming regulatory wave that will make 
disclosure  tighter  and/or  reduce  the  options  of  customisation  of  the  final  product  (through 
centralisation and standardisation). 
9.2  Scenario B 
The  second  scenario  consists  of  moving  the  clearing  of  derivatives  transactions  to  central 
platforms, such as CCPs. These platforms create an infrastructure that can work efficiently if 
products  satisfy  eligibility  requirements.  These  requirements  do  not  exclusively  depend  on 
standardisation, and it will take time before the pressure to centralise clearing services for most 
derivative products will have knock-on effects aimed at promoting more product standardisation 
and allowing a straight-through-processing and faster handling of the transaction. As defined in 
the US proposal, disclosure will still be done through the platform, which has its own reporting 
standards (self-regulated) to disclose aggregate data. Participants will not be asked for more 
disclosure on single trades (if not requested by regulators and on a confidential basis). This 
scenario should thus preserve liquidity, since liquidity is one of the pre-conditions for accessing 
the platform (see Box 2). However, mandating central clearing without taking into account the 
many  diverse  requirements  to  efficiently  process  the  transaction  through  the  platform  may 
increase the cost of trading, reduce liquidity and affect the resilience of the infrastructure. It is 
up to regulators, through consultation with market participants, to define the extension of this 
obligation.  Some  aspects  of  current  EU  proposals  may  subject  specific  infrastructures  to 
unnecessary risks, affecting the ideal and efficient scenario B. For instance, the absence of a 
different regime for non-financial institutions and a legal text without exemptions may be a 
source  of  concern.  The  inefficient  concentration  of  risks  on  CCP  platforms  may  stifle 
innovation and provide few incentives to foster competition. 
9.3  Scenario C 
The third scenario represents an attempt to devise a perfect compromise between customisation 
and disclosure. There are highly customised transactions that cannot be cleared on CCPs (e.g. 
bespoke transactions), but they should be preserved since they can be vital for hedging and risk 
management purposes (e.g. commodity derivatives for energy companies). However, for this 
scenario, regulators will prescribe stricter reporting and record-keeping requirements, as well as 
tougher capital and margin requirements. This outcome will reduce liquidity as derivatives users 
(especially  non-financial  ones)  will  face  higher  costs  to  access  these  financial  instruments. 
Consequently, this may reduce incentives to invest in automation and standardisation of the 
products that have not been accepted for clearing on CCPs. In effect, the incentive of market 
participants to promote further standardisation of bilaterally-cleared transactions will be reduced 
if they do not offer substantial benefits to offset the increasing costs, due to tougher regulation. 
The benefits needed in order to invest in standardisation for bilateral transactions will be reset at 
a higher level, since the cost at trading standardised (but ineligible) transactions bilaterally will 
be  higher  as  well.  A  potential  outcome  may  be  that  a  growing  number  of  derivatives 
transactions will no longer be traded bilaterally, increasing the risks for firms that cannot find 
valuable alternative hedging solutions for their risk profile or increasing their costs, as they have 
to modify their business model to use an alternative product. Conversely, if regulators mandate 
central  clearing  of  standardised  products,  the  outcome  will  present  the  efficiency  issues 
mentioned  above.  Regulators  should  therefore  work  to  find  a  better  equilibrium  between 
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9.4  Scenario D 
The last scenario consists of the mandatory execution of derivatives trades on regulated venues 
with centralised trading and clearing, such as exchanges.
55 These platforms may provide market 
participants with a transparent pool of liquidity, centralised clearing and highly standardised 
terms and conditions. However,  the risks for the survival of these markets (if  one carefully 
considers the reasons behind the use of OTC derivatives products) are directly magnified by the 
indirect imposition of a uniform model of standardisation for derivative s products. Then, the 
few opportunities to find customised products that can cope with specific risk profiles, plus the 
cost of a heavier regulatory framework, can make things worse. The limits to customisation may 
sound the death knell for the OTC derivatives market. The risks of stifling financial innovation 
and then of influencing business models are very high. In addition, there  may not be enough 
liquidity to sustain the OTC market on exchanges (FSA, 2009b). As described in section 4, the 
market structure  has supported its growth and development  through a network of dealers, 
thereby making the use  of OTC derivatives  widespread between financial and non -financial 
institutions. In effect, an exchange will unilaterally redefine available economic, legal and 
technical  terms  of  the  product  (Culp,  2009),  alig ning  it  with  the  primary  needs  of  the 
infrastructure and not with the needs of the counterparties.  
This scenario could only be efficient for products that  do not require much flexibility, have a 
large size and  already show very high volatility. These products can be indexes, such as the 
ones run by financial institutions in the credit defaul t swaps market. For other products , the 
characteristics provided by these execution venues may not be requested by the market, creating 
an inefficient outcome.  The exchange will also define the access rules to the platform and 
handle transaction reporting with no interaction from the counterparty. Products will be shaped 
in  a  different  way  from  that  originally  requested  by  the  demand  creat ing  the  market 
(customisation and flexibility). In this way, counterparties will somehow be forced to adapt their 
business models to the transact ion; otherwise, they will be pushed to leave the market (if 
bilateral transactions are too costly) or to use alternative and costly financial p roducts. For 
instance, an airline company that wants to  obtain  protection with a customised derivative 
transaction for a specific time frame, size and combination of underlying variables will probably 
need to access a similar product, exposing itself to the risk that this completely non-customised 
product  may not  efficiently  hedge its business   risk.  In addition, the OTC market always 
represented an alternative to exchanges and organised venues. With a mandatory solution, 
competition may be irremediably harmed, discouraging innovation in trading technologies and 
product development. 
In conclusion, this scenario should not be mandatory and should be limited only to certain kinds 
of products. Since the benefits of this scenario are currently unclear and the costs of this choice 
are extremely high (FSA, 2009b), regulators should reconsider any kind of mandatory decision 
for derivatives execution, to avoid irremediably altering the structure of the market. The recent 
financial crisis has showed  that  liquidity is the most important  element  in  the  derivatives 
market. Any intervention to shape their structure should  give priority to preserving conditions 
that allow the market to be deep. The concentration of credit risk due to customised transactions 
limits the possibility to access the secondary market in case of insolvency problems. Derivatives 
transactions can be centralised on organised trading venues as long as  limited possibilities to 
customise products will not affect the overall liquidity and flexibility of thi s market, therefore 
also affecting centralised clearing platforms, which suffer more than trading platforms from the 
absence of a liquid market. 
                                                       
55 The assumption is that alternative trading platforms will be regulated in the same way; there could be 
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10.  Conclusions 
So far OTC derivatives markets - by definition - were largely unregulated or poorly regulated. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, however, regulators are taking momentum to reform 
aspects of this huge systemic market. OTC derivatives combine economic and legal risks and 
represent the most complex instruments in financial markets. These risks can be classified as 
idiosyncratic or external, in order to understand how responses should be addressed. Three 
important factors may have devastating effects on this market: 1) illiquidity, 2) counterparty risk 
and 3) legal uncertainty.  
In  its  assessment  of  the major  proposals  to reform  the  OTC  derivatives  market,  this  paper 
arrives at the following policy conclusions, divided into three areas. 
Transactional aspects 
  The  pre-trade  phase  of  a  derivatives  transaction  is  crucial.  It  consists  of  drafting  and 
selecting the economic and legal terms of the transaction. It is important that parties agree 
on terms and methodologies that are recognised and protected by legal rules in the relevant 
legal  jurisdiction  (e.g.  bespoke  transactions).  A  uniformly  and  globally  valid  master 
agreement may substantially reduce risk.  
  Market interventions should push for wider adoption of an electronic system for verification 
and confirmation of trades, in order to minimise outstanding confirmations. Unconfirmed 
trades increase uncertainty on the enforceability and legal validity of the transaction. The 
target should be same-day confirmation or T+1 at latest. 
Trading and clearing 
  Centralisation  of  clearing  can  bring  large  benefits  but  it  dramatically  increases  the 
concentration of risk and requires improving safeguards. However, the run to centralisation 
should be made conditional on the verification of specific circumstances (such as liquidity, 
availability of prices, external risks, etc.). Not all standardised products can be centrally 
cleared, also in accordance with our proposed definition for „standardisation‟ (see Box 1). A 
mandatory solution may weaken the network infrastructure by fostering adverse selection 
and raising huge moral hazard issues. The control of operational risk will crucial in the 
management of these platforms. 
  A  minimum  level  of  interoperability  between  CCPs  -  as  well  as  open  and  non-
discriminatory access to the platforms - is complementary to the process of centralisation of 
clearing. It allows competition in servicing costs, spreading best practices in risk and crisis 
management and improving market entry and default procedures, by introducing specific 
arrangements between these institutions. Interoperability can avoid market segmentation, 
but it raises two huge problems with its implementation: knock-on effects and moral hazard. 
The model of governance should be user-oriented, if the market does not invest in a user-
ownership model. 
  Centralisation of clearing can be an efficient solution for some asset classes that fit with 
eligibility requirements, but it cannot be the solution for all OTC derivatives. In effect, the 
practice of bilateral clearing will continue because the markets need it, and unnecessary 
charges will only create insufficient incentives to use the best clearing services. Bilateral 
and central clearing solutions do not imply that one model is better than another (Bliss & 
Steigerwald, 2006); therefore, solutions that favour one system for all derivative products 
should not be put in place. In effect, for some classes of products the market was already 
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to improve collateral requirements in bilateral transactions in order to efficiently redistribute 
counterparty risk and shield the system from pro-cyclical effects.  
  For  bilateral  transactions,  even  if  stricter  margin  requirements  may  be  economically 
justified (for initial margins only; but for variable ones, the market should decide), stricter 
capital requirements also for non-financial companies may be harmful. Unsustainable costs 
may  push  companies  to  modify  their  business  models  or  to  reduce  their  core  business 
hedges. Capital charges help to discourage the use of derivatives but they do not concretely 
increase the safety of the transaction (capital is subject to other creditors‟ claims, etc.) and 
they  do  not  seem  to  reflect  the  rationale  of  the  transaction.  Outsourcing  collateral 
management and providing additional collateral (with segregated independent amounts) to 
dealers – especially for non-financial companies – can substantially increase the efficiency 
of collateral arrangements and the resilience of bilateral transactions without mandating 
inefficient  capital  charges.  An  efficient  combination  of  stricter  collateral  arrangements 
(higher quality, amounts and legal segregation), daily calls for collateral and „independent 
amounts‟  may  create  a  high  level  of  safety  –  similar  to  CCP  –  without  affecting 
customisation and market liquidity. 
  Centralisation towards organised venues, such as exchanges, may create a dramatic cut of 
customised financial products, which may make it difficult to find alternative solutions able 
to cope with a specific risk profile. In addition, some aspects of OTC derivatives may not be 
„standardisable‟ in the same way as exchange-traded products are. Dealers‟ platforms are 
still  the  principal  venue  where  standardisation  and  customisation  find  their  best 
combination. 
Transparency and Supervision 
  The market for OTC derivatives is systemically important as the uncollateralised exposure 
(a small part of the notional value) is highly volatile and related to the underlying risk, 
which  cannot  be  completely  monitored.  Sudden  market  moves  may  amplify  negative 
effects, triggering liquidity crises and potential domino effects. Risk is concentrated in a few 
global financial institutions, which are „too big to fail‟ or „too interconnected to fail‟ and 
therefore need to be strictly supervised.   
  The derivatives market is structurally affected by the pro-cyclical aspects and suffers from 
the opacity of counterparties‟ real net exposures. Transparency, therefore – more than any 
other  solution  –  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  OTC  derivatives  market.  Opacity  around 
uncollateralised net exposure and unsecured lines of big financial institutions may trigger 
mechanisms of adverse selection that freeze the financial system,  such as occurred,  for 
instance,  in  the  interbank  credit  market  in  October  2008.  A  two-tier  system,  providing 
aggregate data to the public and disaggregated information only on a confidential basis to 
the  authorities,  seems  a  solution  that  preserves  the  business  without  affecting  financial 
stability.  
  Trade repositories (or data repositories) should provide high-quality data services and can 
work efficiently in a competitive environment, but there is no clear need for mandating 
regional repositories. Their role, then, would be different from the one covered by CCPs, 
since they may provide public aggregate and granular data for the market, plus single-name 
data for regulators (on a confidential basis) on bilaterally and centrally-cleared transactions. 
Regulators should verify with market participants if technologies and data formats allow 
concentrating data across asset classes in one data repository. 
  The EU and US proposals to reform the OTC derivatives market share similar objectives 
but they lay out two different roads to achieve them. Striking divergences, if not specifically 50 | DIEGO VALIANTE 
addressed,  may  shape  markets  in  such  ways  that  large  space  is  left  for  regulatory  and 
supervisory arbitrage. For instance, the US exemption granted to trades done for hedging 
purposes may stimulate non-financial European companies to move part of their business in 
the US, if Europe approves a legislative text without exemptions or stricter requirements. 
To sum up, despite the original intention of converging on common rules for OTC derivatives, 
the  final  result  of  current  proposals  seems  to  be  going  in  the  opposite  direction.  The 
commitment to common objectives at G-20 level may actually be discarded, and Europe may 
adopt tougher solutions than the US. The risk of regulatory and supervisory arbitrage is high 
and it could be a source of instability in the years to come. Uniform and efficient regulatory 
actions, as well as international cooperation, may avoid this inefficient disequilibrium. In any 
case, regulators around the world will not leave the OTC derivatives market „unregulated‟. 
Their major concern with the regulation of OTC derivatives instruments is to strike the right 
balance between the limits set by the regulatory intervention and the freedom of market forces 
to lead markets – if wisely guided – towards efficiency. The ability of the market to tailor 
financial products to specific needs through financial innovation should be preserved, in order 
to support economic growth and to diffuse the benefits throughout the entire society.   
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